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Abstract
This thesis presents and discusses the theoretical and empirical literature that
analyses the eﬀects of monetary policy on financial stability. As a means to clarifi-
cation and structure, the thesis will build on the IMF (2013) approach of separating
the diﬀerent eﬀects that monetary policy may have on financial stability. These
eﬀects are divided into five diﬀerent channels. In a literature review, these channels
are carefully examined, and many of the most important contributions to the litera-
ture are presented. In short, the borrower balance sheet channel refers to the eﬀects
that higher monetary policy rates may have on borrowing constraints and therefore
possibly on default rates. The asset price channel refers to the eﬀects that lower
monetary policy rates may have on aggregate asset prices that might lead to asset
price bubbles. The exchange rate channel points to the eﬀects that monetary policy
may have on capital flows and exchange rates, and therefore on foreign borrowing.
The risk-shifting channel refers to the eﬀects that higher monetary policy rates have
on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, possibly reducing banks’ margins. Fi-
nally, the risk-taking channel refers to the potential eﬀects of monetary policy on
the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, which may aﬀect banks’ risk-taking.
The second part of the thesis provides an empirical analysis of a potential risk-
taking channel in Norway. By making use of quarterly panel data for Norwegian
banks over the period 1995 to 2014, I study the eﬀects of an increased three-month
NIBOR interest rate, as a proxy for Norwegian monetary policy, on the composition
of banks’ risk weighted corporate lending. The results provide evidence of a risk-
taking channel. Thus, the results from the analysis suggest that banks’ risk-taking is
negatively associated with interest rates. However, since the estimated interest rate
coeﬃcient is quite small, the economic significance seems modest. I also find evidence
of a less pronounced negative relationship for banks with higher capitalization levels,
which is contrary to the implications suggested by the theory as well as previous
empirical findings in other countries. This literature suggests that the negative
relationship is less pronounced for banks with lower capitalization levels. The results
from the empirical analysis may contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of
monetary policy on financial stability. However, the analysis also clearly indicates a
need of further investigation.
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1 Introduction
Some researchers have blamed central banks for holding interest rates too low for too long
in the run-up to the financial crisis in 2008. As Taylor (2009) argues, "[...] government
actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened the financial crisis". On the
other hand, some have argued that monetary policy authorities only had negligible eﬀects
on the global financial crisis (Stiglitz, 2009). For these reasons, the financial crisis brought
the link between monetary policy and financial stability to the forefront of the economic
policy debate. It is important to emphasize that financial stability has long been an
important consideration of central banks. However, after the financial crisis, there has
been a particular focus on how monetary policy may potentially aﬀect financial stability.
Today, there is an increased concern about the historically low interest rates we currently
observe in many countries, and whether these may be setting the stage for a next financial
crisis. In this thesis I will examine the various eﬀects that monetary policy may have on
financial stability, with an emphasis on its relationship to banks’ risk-taking, the so-
called risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Analyzing the eﬀects of monetary policy
on banks’ risk-taking could help to clarify whether accommodative monetary policy can
lead to build-ups of financial imbalances, and may therefore contribute to the ongoing
debate.
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, I will provide a review of the existing theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on the various channels through which monetary policy aﬀects
financial stability, with an emphasis on the risk-taking channel. Second, I will conduct
an empirical analysis of the link between monetary policy rates and banks’ risk-taking in
Norway, thus potentially providing evidence of a risk-taking channel of Norwegian mon-
etary policy. In this context monetary policy is mainly confined to the managing of key
policy rates.
As a means to clarification and structure, the thesis will build on the IMF (2013) approach
of separating the diﬀerent eﬀects that monetary policy may have on financial stability.
These eﬀects are divided into five distinct channels; the asset price channel, the exchange
rate channel, the borrower balance sheet channel, the risk-shifting channel and the risk-
taking channel. There has been a growth in theoretical and empirical literature analyzing
these channels, and how they may contribute to financial stability. As argued in IMF
(2013), these channels may work in opposing directions: Through the borrower balance
sheet channel, higher interest rates can adversely aﬀect borrowers’ repayment capacity,
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thus contributing to higher risk of default and financial instability. Similarly, for open
economies, a monetary policy tightening can attract excessive capital flows, leading to an
appreciation of the exchange rate and thereby excessive borrowing in foreign currency.
This may cause the financial system to become more vulnerable, as both national and
international shocks may erode the repayment capacity of financial intuitions. Thus the
exchange rate channel of monetary policy may increase the risk of financial instability.
Moreover, higher monetary policy rates may increase banks’ cost of funding, thus possibly
reducing their margins. As a response, banks may choose a riskier portfolio of assets in
order to restore their margins, which may lead to increased risk of financial instability.
This is referred to as the risk-shifting channel. On the other hand, through the asset
price channel, a lower interest rate may increase the risk of asset price bubbles, which
can also be a contributing factor to financial instability. In addition, accommodative
monetary policy might lead banks to increase their risk-taking, as a potential consequence
of reduced return on banks’ assets. This link is known as the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy. A summary of the five channels of monetary policy is given in chart 1,
taken from IMF (2013). It should be noted that in this classification the risk-taking and
risk-shifting channels are treated separately, as monetary policy aﬀects diﬀerent sides of
banks’ balance sheets. However, some of the literature does not distinguish between the
latter two channels, since they both describe mechanisms through which monetary policy
aﬀects banks’ risk-taking behavior.
Chart 1: The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy on Financial Stability. Source: IMF (2013)
In order to illustrate the risk-taking mechanism described above, I also present a simple
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monitoring model advanced by Dell‘Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez (2013), where banks op-
erate in a context of limited liability and asymmetric information about borrower quality.
In this paper the risk-taking channel refers to the eﬀect that monetary policy has on both
sides of banks’ balance sheet. Therefore, in line with the risk-taking and risk-shifting
channels described in the above paragraph, the model predicts two opposing eﬀects on
banks’ risk-taking following an increase in the monetary policy rate. First, a higher key
policy rate translates into a higher lending rate, which increases the incentives for banks
to monitor their portfolios since borrower default is now more costly. Consequently, a
higher key policy rate leads to lower risk-taking, referred to as the pass-through eﬀect.
Second, in the opposite direction, there is a risk-shifting eﬀect associated with the higher
cost of liabilities. Typically, banks transform short-term loanable funds such as deposits
into longer-term loans. Higher key policy rates may reduce intermediation spreads and
thus the value of banks’ future profits, and increase risk-taking incentives. In this simple
model, the capital structure of banks is exogenous, but Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) also
consider several extensions to analyze the risk-taking channel under diﬀerent banking
market structures and when the capital structure is endogenous. The results show that
by changing important aspects of the model, additional eﬀects will arise that will amplify
or dampen the risk-taking channel.
As mentioned above, in the second part of this thesis I will conduct an empirical analysis
of the link between monetary policy rates and banks’ risk-taking in Norway, thus poten-
tially providing evidence of a risk-taking channel of Norwegian monetary policy. Finding
evidence of a risk-taking channel would be a small but important step for further analysis
of how monetary policy might aﬀects financial stability. To my knowledge, there has only
been one previous study of the risk-taking channel in Norway. Karapetyan (2011) studied
the link between expansionary monetary policy and banks’ risk-taking in Norway by using
macro data, but the results do not show any statistical evidence of riskier activities follow-
ing expansionary monetary policy. In this thesis I will analyze the link between short-term
interest rates and banks’ risk-taking using data on individual Norwegian banks’ corporate
lending taken from an administrative record of banks’ characteristics (ORBOF). I will
make use of quarterly panel data on 163 Norwegian banks over the period 1995 to 2014.
Following Karapetyan (2011), the three-month NIBOR interest rate is used as a proxy for
the Norwegian key policy rate. The results from the analysis show statistical evidence of a
negative relationship between monetary policy and banks’ risk-taking. However, since the
estimated interest rate coeﬃcient is quite small, the economic significance seems modest.
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Moreover, there are several concerns regarding the empirical specification that need to
be addressed. I also find evidence of a less pronounced negative relationship for banks
with lower leverage, which is contrary to the implications suggested by the theory as well
as previous empirical findings in other countries. In line with the risk-shifting eﬀect of
monetary policy, this literature suggests that the potential negative relationship is less
pronounced for banks with higher leverage.
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows: In section 2, I will introduce definitions of
financial stability and monetary policy. In Section 3, I present previous contributions
to the literature that analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial
stability, with an emphasis on the risk-taking channel. In Section 4, I will present the
descriptive statistics of the main variables and the empirical methodology. In section 5, I
will present the main results, discussions and policy implications of the analysis. Finally,
in section 7, I reflect on the material presented and discussed in the thesis in concluding
remarks.
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2 Definitions
It is well established in the literature that the main objective of monetary policy is price
stability, meaning to insure a stable price level or a low level of inflation (Walsh, 2014).
By using the key policy rate, the central bank aﬀects the price level and the economy
through various channels, called the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. For
instance, a reduction in the key policy rate might lead to lower interest rates on bank
loans leading to increased demand for credit and higher investment levels. The central
bank can alter financial conditions, not only by changing the interest rate, but also by
signaling their view about future economic conditions and the likely policy response.
The world has on several occasions experienced that financial instability can have negative
impacts on the real economy. For instance, the banking crisis in Norway in 1988-1993 led
to huge bank losses that were transmitted to lower lending and lower economic growth for
several years (Norges Bank, 2004). It is, however, not obvious what characterizes financial
stability. In this section, I therefore present definitions of financial stability and monetary
policy to delimit and clarify the analysis.
2.1 Financial Stability
Central bankers and other policy makers have become significantly more concerned about
financial stability over the last decade (Yellen, 2014). However, financial stability has also
been important to central banks earlier in history. As an example, in a speech in 2004, the
governor of the Swedish Riksbank noted that the central bank back in 1992 had to support
the financial system in order to reduce the risk of a financial crisis (Heikensten, 2004).
Despite the apparent relevance of stability in the financial system to the responsible au-
thorities, there is no clear consensus in the literature on the definition of this notion.
According to Allen and Wood (2006, p. 152) financial stability is "...about institutions
not suddenly collapsing and causing economic damage to people who could not reason-
able have been expected to anticipate the collapse." They also emphasize that a good
definition of financial stability must be related to welfare, observable and in the hands
of public authorities, and it should not be so rigorously that any kind of change is a
sign of instability. Building on many of the same principles, but taking a slightly more
specific and operational approach, Norges Bank (2013b, p. 6) defines financial stability
as involving "...a financial system that is resilient to shocks and is capable of channeling
funds, executing payments and distributing risks eﬃciently."
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When defining financial stability, Issing (2003) claims it is important to distinguish be-
tween imbalances in the whole system and those only aﬀecting local financial markets.
An abrupt fall in the stock market does not necessarily need to be a problem of finan-
cial instability, as long as the fall in prices only leads to redistribution between economic
agents without negative impacts on the real economy. Following the definitions proposed
by Allen and Wood (2006) and Norges Bank (2013b), financial stability is clearly related
to the systemic risk of the financial system.
Furthermore, Borio (2003) and Natvig (2011) emphasize that we can distinguish between
two dimensions of systemic risk, the cross-sectional and the time dimension: The cross-
sectional dimension concerns the distribution of risk across financial institutions at a
given point in time, including the correlation between these institutions’ exposure to risk.
This further relates to how specific shock to the financial system can propagate itself and
become systemic. As explained by Caruana (2010), the financial system is a network
of interconnected balance sheets in which a shock hitting one institution can spread to
other institutions and thus become systemic. The time dimension, on the other hand,
relates to the development of systemic risk over time, and hence the mutual reinforcement
between movements in macroeconomic and financial variables: Over the business cycle,
the dynamics of the financial system and the real economy is connected and reinforce each
other, increasing the amplitude of booms and busts (Caruana, 2010).
The above definitions of financial stability are wide and contain little practical guidance for
any institution trying to contribute to the maintenance of financial stability. Therefore, it
can be useful to define certain measures that historically have performed well as indicators
that signal the potential build-ups of financial imbalances. As explained by Norges Bank
(2013a), identifying financial imbalances can be demanding since the type of imbalance
and the risks that they convey vary both between countries and over time. Lessons
from earlier country-specific crises as well as economic theory will therefore guide the
responsible authorities in its choice of suitable and well-preforming indicators. A list
of indicators used by Norges Bank to monitor the financial system is included in the
appendix section A.4.
It is important to emphasize that the scope of this thesis is to investigate whether there
is existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Norway. Financial institutions
seeking higher return by increasing leverage and purchasing riskier assets, may lead the
financial system to become more fragile and vulnerable to shock hitting the economy.
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Hence, increased risk-taking by banks, may lead to increased systemic risks, and thereby
might impose risks to the financial stability.
2.2 Asymmetric Information and Limited Liability
A general problem in financial markets is the presence of financial frictions such as asym-
metric information, in combination with limited liability. Agents operating under limited
liability do not internalize the losses they impose on other economic agents, who can
lead the former to take more risk than what is socially optimal (De Nicolo, Dell‘Ariccia,
Laeven and Valencia, 2010). According to Sinn (2001), this type of behavior could not oc-
cur without the presence of asymmetric information, since this leads the parties sustaining
the potential losses unable to negotiate for compensation before or while the risk-taking
decision is made. If the parties were able to negotiate, this would erode agents’ incentives
to take additional risks, since the gain of taking higher risk would be ruled out by the
higher cost of the liabilities. As described in Leeper and Nason (2014), "incomplete mar-
kets imply financial market frictions that prevent economic agents from perfectly sharing
risk. If these frictions did not exist, financial stability would be of no concern."
2.3 Monetary Policy Actions
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the eﬀects of monetary policy on financial stability.
As mentioned in the introduction, our definition of monetary policy is mainly confined
to the managing of key policy rates, and largely ignores other instruments. To achieve
the operational target of monetary policy the Norwegian central bank’s most important
instrument is the key policy rate, which is the interest rate on bank deposits up to a
quota in Norges Bank. This rate works as an interest rate "floor" in the Norwegian
interbank money market. If the central bank makes sure that there is enough liquidity
in the banking system, the short-term interbank interest rates will remain close to the
central bank’s policy rate (Hoﬀ, 2010).
The policy rate expectations in the future also may be important. Norges Bank has since
2005 published forecasts for key policy rates to signal what the market should expect from
central bank behavior in the future, and how the participants should expect the central
bank to react to certain disturbances in the Norwegian economy. The role of interest
rate expectations will be further discussed in section 3.1, where it is argued that such
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expectations may also be important for banks’ risk-taking, and thus have implications for
financial stability.
As a means to anchor the public’s expectations of future monetary policy, the Norwegian
central bank publishes interest rate forecasts in the form of a future interest rate path.
According to Norges Bank (2012) an appropriate interest rate path should meet the
following criteria; the inflation target is achieved, the inflation targeting regime is flexible,
meaning that the central bank is not a strict inflation targeter, and in particular, that
monetary policy takes into account considerations of financial stability. Moreover, the
central bank attempts to inform the market participants about the likely response of the
central bank to the diﬀerent factors in its flexible inflation targeting regime. The central
bank’s weighing of the diﬀerent factors is represented in a simplified form through a loss
function of the form:
L = (⇡t   ⇡⇤)2 +  (yt   y⇤t )2 +  (it   it 1)2 + ⌧(it   i⇤t )2 (1)
where  ,   and ⌧ represent the relative weights, yt   y⇤t is the output gap, (⇡t   ⇡⇤) is
the inflation gap, (it   it 1) indicates that interest rate should be changes gradually and
(it   i⇤t ) measure that deviation from the normal level (Norges Bank, 2012).
Following Karapetyan (2011), I will in the empirical analysis, use the three month NIBOR
interest rate as a proxy for the Norwegian monetary policy stance. An eﬀective monetary
policy means that changes in the current key policy rate will be reflected in the short-
term money market interest rates, while the eﬀect on long-term interest rates will depend
on the degree to which the conduct of monetary policy aﬀects inflationary expectations,
and the markets’ expectations of monetary policy in the future. The NIBOR interest
rate is regarded as the best possible estimate of the market rate, and shall reflect the
interest rate that a bank would charge on lending in NOK to a bank that is active in
the Norwegian money market (Norges Bank, 2014a). It has been shown in an empirical
analysis of Norwegian money marked in the period 2007 to 2012, that the key policy
rate has a broad impact on short-term interest rates: Bernhardsen (2012) estimates the
equation i fstyr = a+bfstyr+cX, where i is the three month money market interest rate,
fstyr is the expected three month key policy rate and X is a vector of control variables.
Bernhardsen (2012) finds that b equals approximately zero, and concludes that this may
be an indication of the eﬀectiveness of the Norwegian central bank’s monetary policy.
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3 Literature Review: The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
on Financial Stability
As pointed out in section 2.1, after the financial crisis, central bankers and other policy
makers have become significantly more concerned about financial stability. While earlier
in history, the focus has mainly been on the financial conditions in general, after this crisis,
there has been a greater focus on how monetary policy may potentially aﬀect financial
stability. As an example, in 2013, the key policy rates were held low for a long time period.
The Norwegian central bank stressed that they were aware that this potentially could lead
to buildup of financial imbalances, and that these considerations were taken into account
in the monetary policy decision (Norges Bank, 2013c, p. 7-8). Another example is a speech
by the Fed governor Janet Yellen in 2014. She emphasized that: "I am also mindful of the
potential for low interest rates to heighten the incentives of financial market participants
to reach for yield and take on risk..." (Yellen, 2014).
The literature has contributed to the identification of a number of channels in which policy
rates can aﬀect financial decisions and impose risks to financial stability. As mentioned
in the introduction, IMF (2013) separates the diﬀerent eﬀects of monetary policy on
financial stability into five distinct channels. These channels may operate simultaneously,
with their strength varying with the stage of the cycle, the overall health of the financial
sector, financial structure, and other country specific characteristics.
3.1 The Risk-Taking Channel
The recent global financial crisis led the debate on the link between short-term interest
rates and banks’ risk-taking to the forefront of the academic policy debate. This link is
also known as the monetary policy’s risk-taking channel, the notion that the interest rate
aﬀects not only the quantity, but also the quality of banks’ balance sheets (Dell‘Ariccia
et al., 2013). As we will see, the empirical and theoretical literature indicate that accom-
modative monetary policy may lead to increased risk-taking by financial institutions. It
is important to emphasize that the increased risk-taking may be an intended eﬀect of the
central bank’s policy response, and therefore not a concern to the responsible authority
(Yellen, 2014). On the other hand, if the increased risks substantially increase the vulner-
ability of the financial system to shocks, then through the risk-taking channel, monetary
policy may impose risks to financial stability.
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I will in this section present some of the literature that analyzes how monetary policy
may aﬀect banks’ risk-taking. Mainly, the literature discusses the eﬀects of changing the
level of the key policy rates. However, monetary policy might aﬀect banks’ risk-taking
incentives in other ways than just through the level of policy rates. For instance, if
economic agents expect monetary policy to be eased during recessions to support the
real economy and the financial system, this may also give rise to additional risk-taking
incentives (IMF, 2013).1
3.1.1 Portfolio Eﬀects and the Search for Yield
Most of the literature that discusses the risk-taking channel emphasizes that lower mon-
etary policy rates lead to higher risk-taking by banks. De Nicolo et al. (2010) argue that
the risk-taking channel mainly is based on the following three mechanisms: asset substitu-
tion, search-for-yield and pro cyclical leverage.2 The asset substitution eﬀect is related to
the impact of monetary policy rates on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Assuming
that lower key policy rates are reflected into lower interest rates on safe assets, everything
else equal, this may reduce the expected yield in banks’ portfolios. As a consequence, De
Nicolo et al. (2010) suggest that this may increase risk-neutral banks’ demand for risker
assets, hence in aggregate reducing the yield, until in equilibrium the returns on both types
of assets are again equalized. Thus, lower monetary policy rates may lead to reallocation
in banks’ portfolios toward more risk exposure. A second and related mechanism, is the
search-for-yield eﬀect, originally advanced by Rajan (2006), that is especially relevant for
financial intermediaries with long-term commitments, for example pension funds. These
intermediates often need to match the yield they promised on their liabilities, with what
they obtain on their assets. Lower monetary policy rates will only aﬀect the asset-side of
the balance sheets, as the intermediates have to pay the same interest on their liabilities
regardless of changes in the monetary policy stance. As a consequence, De Nicolo et al.
(2010) argue that if the intermediaries stay with safe but low return assets, they are likely
to default for sure, while if they invest in riskier but higher return assets, they still have
some chance of not defaulting on their commitments. On the other hand, when interest
rates are high, the intermediates can generate the necessary revenue by investing in safe
assets since they are more likely to match the yield on their liabilities.
The third mechanism proposed in the paper by De Nicolo et al. (2010) is a pro cyclical
1This "bail out" policy expected by economic agents will lead to a time consistency problem. This is
shown in a model developed by Jeanne and Korinek (2013).
2Bank leverage in this thesis is defined as banks’ total assets to equity.
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leverage eﬀect of monetary policy, originally advanced by Adrian and Shin (2008). Since
lower monetary policy rates tend to increase asset prices, this may boost the value of
banks equity, which everything else equal, leads to a fall in banks’ leverage. Moreover,
it is argued that the banks target constant leverage ratios, and tend to buy assets rather
than distributing dividends. As a consequence, following a reduction in monetary policy
rates, banks react to the fall in leverage by increasing demand for assets, which will result
in a more fragile banking system that may be more exposed to shocks in asset prices (De
Nicolo et al., 2010).
These three mechanisms predict that there is a negative relationship between short-term
interest rates and banks’ risk-taking. However, at least for the asset substitution and
search-for-yield mechanisms, the eﬀects completely rely on the assumption of a positive
pass-through from monetary policy rates to the yield on banks assets. Adrian and Liang
(2014) suggest that it is the interaction between monetary policy and the presence of fi-
nancial frictions that may lead to the moral hazard problem of risk-taking and as a result
may impose risks to financial stability. As explained in section 2.2, a general problem in
financial markets is the presence of limited liability and asymmetric information. De Ni-
colo et al. (2010) suggest that banks operating under these frictions will tend to take more
risk than what is socially optimal. Furthermore, that highly leveraged banks will tend to
take more risk compared to banks with low leverage, as the former do not internalize the
potential losses caused on the depositors. Therefore, the more a bank potentially can lose
in the case of failure, or the more "skin-in-the-game" the bank has, this will lead banks
to invest more prudently.
3.1.2 The "Greenspan Put"
Finally, De Nicolo et al. (2010) suggest an eﬀect of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking,
which often is referred to as the "Greenspan put".3 This eﬀect arises from the expected
reaction function of the central bank, and is not directly an eﬀect of the adjustment of
policy interest rates. De Nicolo et al. (2010) suggest that banks take additional risk when
they expect a policy response or a "bailout" from the central bank to a negative shock.
The reasoning is that expected "bailout" policies from the central bank relaxes potential
binding constraints after a financial crisis, and distort the incentives of private agents to
be prudent in the initial period. This might lead to a time consistency problem for the
central bank. Ex ante, the central bank would like to commit to smaller than the (ex
3This is also advanced in Diamond and Rajan (2011).
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post) optimal policy response so as to mitigate the additional risk problem. However, ex
post, once the economy has entered a period with binding constraints, the central bank
would like to provide the optimal bailout (Jeanne and Korinek, 2013). Still, the level
of the interest rate matters for the magnitude of this eﬀect. To the extent that there is
greater room for monetary stimulus when rates are high than when they are low, higher
rates will correspond to greater risk-taking.
3.1.3 A Simple Static Model of Banks’ Risk-Taking
In this section, I will present a simple static model of banks’ risk-taking advanced by
Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013). In this model, loans are the only type of asset and they need to
be monitored in order to increase the repayment probability. The bank can exert mon-
itoring eﬀort q, which guarantees an identical repayment probability to a cost (1/2)cq2.
The degree of risk-taking will, therefore depend on the bank’s incentives to monitor its
portfolio. The banking system is perfectly competitive and banks fund themselves by
equity () and deposits. Banks operate in a context of limited liability and asymmetric
information, and therefore repay depositors only in case of success.
In this simple model, banks’ capitalization levels are exogenous, so banks cannot adjust
leverage when the real monetary policy rate, r⇤, changes. For simplicity, it is also assumed
that the deposit rate (rD) equals the policy rate.4 Equity is more costly, with a yield
rE = (r⇤ + ⇠)/q, with ⇠   0 which represent the equity premium. The cost, rE, can be
interpreted as the opportunity cost for a bank of investing its equity in the bank, adjusted
to reflect risk-taking through the probability of success q.
For a fixed interest rate r⇤, banks choose the competitive interest rate to charge on loans,
and then choose how much to monitor their portfolio. A representative bank’s expected
profit is given by:
⇧ =
✓
q
 
rL   rD(1  )  rE
   ✓1
2
◆
cq2
◆
L(rL)
=
✓
q
 
rL   rD(1  )
   (r⇤ + ⇠)  ✓1
2
◆
cq2
◆
L(rL)
(2)
We can see from this equation that if the investment succeeds, the bank earns (rL  
rD(1 )  rE) after repaying depositors. When the investment fails, however, the bank
4The assumption that the deposit rate equals the policy rate, implies that depositors are protected by
deposit insurance, and therefore also are insensitive to risk-taking.
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receives nothing and due to limited liability it must not repay the depositors. It can be
shown that by maximizing equation 2 with respect to q and setting rD = r⇤ will give:
qˆ = min
⇢
rL   r⇤(1  )
c
, 1
 
(3)
By substituting equation 3 back into the profit function (equation 2), and solving for the
lending rate (by imposing zero-profit in the competitive equilibrium) we find that:
rL = r
⇤(1  ) +
p
2ck(r⇤ + ⇠) (4)
By inserting this back to equation 3, we find the optimal monitoring rate:
q⇤ =
p
(2c(r⇤ + ⇠)
c
(5)
from which it is immediate that (@q⇤/@r) > 0. We can see from equation 3 that an
increase in the reference rate, r⇤, aﬀects monitoring, and thus risk-taking, through two
distinct channels. A tightening of monetary policy aﬀects both the asset side and liability
side of banks’ balance sheets. On the asset side, a higher monetary policy rate aﬀects
the interest rate on loans (rL). A higher interest rate on loans increase the incentives to
monitor, since borrower default is now more costly, which is called the pass-through eﬀect.
Therefore, higher interest rates may lead to decreased risk-taking incentives. On the other
hand, on the liability side, due to market imperfections, higher deposit rates decrease
monitor incentives when interest rates increase, through the risk-shifting mechanism. The
interest rate the bank has to pay on its deposits goes up, which (everything else equal)
reduces banks’ profit in case of success, and, hence the incentives to monitoring the
portfolio. Therefore, higher interest rates may lead to increased risk-taking incentives.
This result implies that when banks are unable to adjust their capitalization levels, we
will observe diﬀerences in the risk-taking behavior depending on banks’ capitalization
levels. Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) argue that for a bank entirely funded by deposits (fully
leveraged) the risk-shifting eﬀect is maximal. However, this eﬀect goes to zero for a
bank fully funded with capital. Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) conclude that this simple model
produces the following testable implication, namely that "[b]ank risk-taking is negatively
associated with interest rates if banks are not capital constrained. However, this negative
relationship depends on the capitalization of the bank and is less pronounced for poorly
capitalized banks."
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3.1.4 The Role of Leverage and Market Structure
In Dell‘Ariccia, Leaven and Marquz (2010) this simple model is extended by assuming
that banks choose the capitalization levels that maximize profits. The assumption of
deposit insurance is also relaxed, so depositors will now demand a deposit rate depending
on expected risk-taking. Depositors know that a highly leveraged bank will have a smaller
incentive to monitor, so the demanded interest rate equals rD = r⇤/E(q|k). Therefore,
when the monetary policy rate increases, the banks take into account that by reducing
some of their leverage, depositors will demand a lower interest rate. It follows that as the
policy rate increases, so does the benefit from lower leverage, the only commitment device
available to the bank. As a consequence, bank leverage decreases with the monetary policy
rate. Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2010) argue that when banks optimally choose their capitalization
levels, the aggregated eﬀect of higher monetary policy rates is that banks would be less
leveraged and take less risk. Conversely, reductions in r⇤ would lead to more highly levered
banks and reduced monitoring eﬀort.
Finally, Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2010) explore the idea that the type of market structure in the
loan market matters for risk-taking. Two banking structures are examined; a perfectly
competitive credit market where banks take the lending rate as given, and a market
featuring a monopolist facing a loan demand function that is perfectly inelastic up to
some fixed loan rate R (the reservation level). The assumption of deposit insurance is
still relaxed and banks’ capitalization levels are exogenous. Intuitively, the pass-through
from monetary policy rates to lending rates is higher the more competitive is the market.
Therefore, irrespective of banks’ level of leverage, risk-taking will decrease with the policy
rate. On the other hand, when a profit-maximizing monopolist dominates the banking
market, there might be a positive relationship between banks’ risk-taking and monetary
policy. Assuming that the profit-maximizing monopolist will in this case set the lending
rate at the maximum value, monetary policy will only aﬀect the liability side of the bank’s
balance sheet. Therefore, only the risk-shifting eﬀect will be present. As a result, risk-
taking will increase in the policy rate since higher policy rates will reduce the monopolist’s
margins, and hence reduce the incentive to monitor. This illustrates that the eﬀect of
monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking may depend on the structure of the banking system,
and as a consequence, that the relationship may not be universally negative.
3.1.5 Risk-taking and Volatility of Monetary Policy
De Groot (2013) examines how monetary policy aﬀects the riskiness of the financial sector
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by using a DSGE model with nominal frictions. In this model, the banking sector can issue
both outside equity and debt, making banks’ exposure to risk an endogenous choice and
dependent on the policy environment. The main interest in the paper is the composition
of the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. De Groot (2013) argues that:
"The recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of financial intermediaries’ balance
sheets, demonstrating that the extent to which financial intermediaries leverage them-
selves, and the extent to which financial intermediaries make use of debt finance, aﬀect
the probability of future financial crisis occurring and the amount of damage a negative
shock ... does to the economy." (De Groot 2013, p 115)
It is assumed that banks have three available sources of funding: inside equity, outside
equity (external equity issuance) and external debt (household deposits). Building on the
claim that leverage and the share of debt finance are sources to financial instability, the
model shows that periods of tranquility in the economy can generate build-up of risks
since financial institutions increase the size and leverage of their balance sheets, and rely
more heavily on debt financing. Moreover, De Groot (2013) argues that, if the bank
is heavily reliant on debt, which is a non-state-contingent claim on the bank, then any
fluctuations in the asset return will have to be absorbed by bank’s net worth. On the
other hand, since the return on outside equity is state contingent and linked to the return
on assets, it provides a valuable hedge for banks’ net worth when uncertainty is high. As
a result, according to this framework, the optimal composition of banks’ balance sheets
will depend on the stochastic nature of asset returns, and one of the determinants is the
policy environment. De Groot (2013) suggests that banks would like to stabilize volatility
in the shadow value of their net worth. If monetary policy acts to achieve this, then
banks may have less incentive to resort to outside equity finance and may leverage up
their balance sheets.
3.1.6 Empirical Literature
After the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a growth in the empirical literature
that studies the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, and I will in this section present
the results from some of these studies. As an example, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro and
Saurina (2014), use loan-level data from the Spanish credit registry and provide evidence
that banks increase lending to riskier borrowers when interest rates are low. Oannidou,
Ongena and Peydro (2009) report similar results with data from Bolivia. The conclusions
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are further confirmed by Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) and Maddaloni and Peydro (2010) in
a study of the U.S. loan market.
Evidence of a Risk-Taking Channel in the United States
Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) studied the link between short-term interest rates (the federal
funds rate) and ex ante risk-taking over the period 1997-2011 by making use of loan-
level data on individual U.S. banks’ loan ratings from the Federal Reserve’s Survey on
Terms of Business Lending (STBL). In the survey, all loans approved by banks are risk
rated on a scale from 1 (minimal risk) to 5 (high risk). The main interest of the paper
is the relationship between this risk-rating and monetary policy. The results point to
a significantly negative relationship between short-term interest rates and banks’ risk-
taking, which is consistent with a risk-taking mechanism. In addition, the relationship
seems to be weaker for poorly capitalized banks. They also find evidence that the strength
of this relationship is stronger when interest rates are held low for extended periods.
The authors emphasize that the empirical results should not be interpreted as implying
that the additional risk associated with lower rates is excessive. To further investigate
if they have actually identified the eﬀect of interest rates on banks’ risk-taking, several
robustness checks are conducted.5 The results from these robustness checks provide addi-
tional evidence that they have identified the existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary
policy.
A key assumption underlying the identification approach is that a lower monetary policy
rate is exogenous to bank risk-taking. Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) argue that since the analy-
sis is mostly conducted ahead of the financial crisis, it is fair to say that financial stability
considerations played a limited role in the setting of monetary policy, and that this was
primarily the job of supervisory and regulatory authorities. Further, to shed light on the
relevance of these considerations, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
meetings are analyzed, searching for keywords associated with financial stability.
Maddaloni and Peydro (2010), also use survey data, and find that low interest rates led
to an excessive softening of lending standards to firms and households in both the U.S.
5They perform several sample splits to address specific endogeneity concerns. As an example, they run
regressions in subsamples of loans from local banks, where they argue that these banks are less influenced
by national economic activity. They still find a significant, negative relationship between interest rates
and loan risk rating.
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and in the Eurozone. Further, they find that the eﬀect were stronger when interest rates
had been long for extended periods, supervision was weaker and securitization activity
greater. Maddaloni and Peydro (2010) also studied risk-taking related to long periods of
negative Taylor-rule residuals, and found that negative residuals for long periods of time
led to excessive risk-taking by banks. They also argue that these findings were a key
contributing factor of the last financial crisis.
Evidence of a Risk-Taking Channel in Spain, Bolivia and Norway
As mentioned above, Jiménez et al. (2014) and Oannidou et al. (2009) report similar re-
sults using loan-level data from respectively Spain and Bolivia. Despite that the authors
access data from diﬀerent countries, diﬀerent time periods and employ diﬀerent method-
ologies, they both find evidence of a negative relationship between monetary policy and
banks’ risk-taking.
Jiménez et al. (2014) analyzed the impact of the monetary policy stance (overnight rates)
on the level of risk of individual bank loans, using register (micro) data over the period
1984 to 2009 from the banking supervisor in Spain. Since Spain is part of the Eurozone,
monetary policy is said to be fairly exogenous. The results indicate that a lower overnight
interest rate induces banks to engage in higher risk-taking. Further, a lower overnight
interest rate leads lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante
risky firms than highly capitalized banks and that, when granted, the committed loans
are larger in volume and are more likely to be uncollateralized.
Using loan-level register data from Bolivia over the period 1999 to 2003, Oannidou et al.
(2009) analyzed the impact of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking and pricing of new
bank loans. During this period the local currency, Bolivian Peso, was pegged to the
US dollar and the banking system was almost fully dollarized, and as a consequence,
monetary policy was dependent on U.S. monetary policy. In this paper, several loan-
specific measures of banks’ risk-taking are studied. The risk measures considered are:
time to individual loan default, current or past borrower default, and internal credit
ratings at origination. The results indicate that when interest rates are low, not only do
banks increase the number of risky loans but they also reduce the rates they charge to
riskier borrowers relative to what they charge to less risky ones. In addition, banks with
more liquid assets and less funds from foreign financial institutions (and therefore more
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robust balance sheets) take more risk when rates are low and they price the additional
risk even more negatively than other banks.
In Norway, there has only been one pervious study that investigates the potential existence
of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Karapetyan (2011) analyzed the impact of
expansionary monetary policy on a measure of bank portfolio risk in the period 1979 to
2010. The measure of a bank’s risk-taking was the share of troubled loans, where trouble
loans are those where payments for more than 90 days are not made. Using aggregated
(macro level) data there is no evidence of a risk-taking channel, but Karapetyan (2011)
suggests that this question should be investigated at a micro level.
3.2 The Risk-Shifting Channel
As seen from the simple model in section 3.1.3, there may be a risk-shifting eﬀect of
monetary policy that works in the opposite direction of the pass-through and leverage
eﬀects. Thus, that there might be a positive relationship between monetary policy and
risk-taking. According to IMF (2013), the risk-shifting eﬀect enters from the liability
side of banks’ balance sheets, and is particularly relevant for banks’ that fund themselves
short-term at variable rates, but lend long-term at fixed rates. Consequently, following
a monetary policy tightening, banks’ margins fall, which may lead lenders to seek more
risk. Indeed, lower margins may induce movement intro riskier assets and toward higher
leverage to maintain return (IMF, 2013). Using loan level data, Landier and Sraer (2011)
provide evidence of this channel by examine the lending behavior of a large subprime
mortgage originator (New Century Financial Corporation) starting in 2004.
Landier and Sraer (2011) studied the behavior of the subprime originator after a mone-
tary policy tightening implemented by the Fed in the spring of 2004, which destroyed a
significant fraction of the originator’s shareholder value. They further observe that New
Century reacted to this by massively oﬀering "interest-only" loans, which are not only
riskier, but the returns were also designed more sensitive to real estate prices than stan-
dard contracts. Interest-only loans means that borrowers pay interest only in a teaser
period, which in this case was 24 months. After this period, refinancing is in many cases
necessary since monthly payments increase dramatically, as the borrower begins to repay
the principal. To refinance, the borrower must have built some wealth the last 24 months,
so this wealth could be used to borrow at a lower rate. Therefore, the refinancing might
require an increase in real estate prices. In a weak real estate market, refinancing with
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better terms can become impossible, and therefore, some borrowers have no other choice
but to default. According to Landier and Sraer (2011), originating these loans was a bet
on the appreciation of real estate prices.
3.3 The Asset Price Channel
A potential source of financial instability is sharp increases in asset prices, as a consequence
of an accommodative monetary, which often are referred to as the asset price channel
(IMF, 2013). After the financial crisis in 2008, policy authorities in the aﬀected countries
have been criticized for holding monetary policy rates too low for long periods, leading to
massive increases in asset prices, which in some cases can be referred to as an asset price
bubble.
Lower monetary policy rates tend to increase asset prices on for example houses and
stocks, increasing the net worth of borrowers and lenders. As described in Bjørnland and
Jacobsen (2010), housing has a dual role of being both a store of wealth and a durable
consumption good. Hence, expansionary monetary policy might raise household wealth,
which again raises consumption spending and aggregate demand. In addition, house prices
influences banks’ balance sheets. If real estate prices rise because of a monetary expansion,
then banks’ loan losses may decrease, which increases bank capital and thus lending.
Therefore, accommodative monetary policy may raise both the supply and demand for
credit, which will increase asset prices even further. As a consequence, there may be a
feedback loop between eased financial constraints and rising asset prices, which is referred
to as a "financial accelerator" mechanism advanced in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999).
Mishkin (2001) also illustrates the asset price mechanism by using Tobin’s q theory. The
Nobel Prize winning economist James Tobin proposed that firms base their investment
decisions on the following ratio:
q =
Market Value of Capital
Replacement Cost of Capital
(6)
If q is high, then the market price of firms is high relative to the replacement costs, and
new capital is cheap relative to the market value of firms. Companies can then issue
stocks, and get a high price for it relative to the cost of capital. Investment spending
will rise, since firms can buy capital with only a small issuance of stocks. Expansionary
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monetary policy, which lowers interest rates, makes bonds less attractive relative to stocks
and result in increased demand for stocks that bids up their price (Mishkin, 2001).
The financial amplification eﬀects described above may be related to pecuniary external-
ities (higher asset prices) when atomistic agents do not internalize that their individual
actions lead to relative price movements that reinforce shocks in the aggregate (Jeanne
and Korinek, 2013). As a result, we may end up with a more fragile economy and financial
system that is more exposed to shocks.
3.3.1 Empirical Literature
IMF (2009) tried to shed some light on the validity of the criticism of monetary policy
being too loose from 2002 to 2006, which in turn contributed to the house price booms
and subsequent busts the previous decade. The authors argue that if monetary policy
was a cause of the house price booms, there would be a systematic relationship between
monetary policy conditions and changes in house prices across economies. By studying
the relationship between average real policy rates and changes in real house prices for
a range of advanced economies, they find no association between measures of monetary
policy and house price increases in the full sample6.
In Norway, there have also been a few studies of the link between monetary policy and
asset price movements. Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010) analyzed the role of house prices
in the monetary transmission mechanism in three small open economies, Norway, UK
and Sweden. They find that, following an increase of the monetary policy rate of one
percentage point, house prices fall by 3-5 percent. Robstad (2014) also aims to quantify
the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on household credit and house prices in Norway.
Overall, the evidence supports the findings of Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010), and the
results further suggest that the eﬀect of monetary policy on house prices is quite large.
Negro and Otrok (2007) analyzed the relationship between monetary policy rates and
house price increases in the United States, and turned to data on house price growth from
1986 to 2005. In the beginning of the 21th century some metropolitan areas in the U.S.
experienced a dramatically increase in house prices, however, this was not homogenous
across diﬀerent states. Some states, for example California, New Jersey and Rhode Island
6The full sample consists of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland,
Denmark, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United States.
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experienced house price growth rates at above 10 percent per year, while other states,
like Texas and Ohio, only had a house price growth at about 2 percent per year. There-
fore, Negro and Otrok (2007) investigate whether the increase in house prices reflected a
national phenomenon (for example monetary policy) or if it was due to "local bubbles".
The results indicate that through the sample period (1986 to 2005), movements in house
prices were mainly driven by the components at the local level. However, when the rela-
tionship is studied at specific periods form the beginning of the 21th century, the results
show that the pattern was diﬀerent. For a number of states that experienced a large
increase in house prices, a substantial fraction of these increases was attributable to the
national factor. Therefore, Negro and Otrok (2007) investigate to what extent monetary
policy was behind this co-movement. The results indicate that the impact of monetary
policy shocks on house prices is non-negligible, but overall fairly small in comparison with
the magnitude of the price increase. Therefore, the authors conclude that expansionary
monetary policy was not an important factor behind the boom in house prices.
3.4 The Borrower Balance Sheet Channel
3.4.1 Theoretical literature
Higher monetary policy rates may have an impact on borrowing constraints and might in-
crease the risk of financial instability. As an example, higher monetary policy rates might
increase the repayment burden for variable rate borrowers, increasing the probability for
borrower default. Thus, the borrower balance sheet channel promotes a positive relation-
ship between monetary policy and the risk of financial instability. According to Gertler
and Gilchrist (2009), the balance sheet channel is typically existent under the presence
of agency problems between borrowers and lenders7. These imperfections will lead to a
wedge between the cost for firms to raise capital externally and the opportunity cost of
capital for the firm, which in the literature is referred to as the external finance premium.
The balance sheet channel is based on the theoretical prediction that this premium will
depend on the borrower’s financial position. In particular, the greater the borrower’s
net worth - defined as the sum of the liquid assets and marketable collateral - the lower
the external finance premium (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Consequently, the cost of
raising external funds is lower for high net worth agents, since a borrower with more
"skin in the game" has greater incentives to make well-informed investment choices. As a
7As we saw in section 2.2, asymmetric information about borrower‘s quality and limited liability is
often precent in financial markets.
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result, lenders assume less risk when lending to high net worth agents, and agency costs
are lower. Therefore, since the borrower’s financial position aﬀects the external finance
premium, and thus the amount of credit he faces, fluctuations in the balance sheet will
aﬀect spending and investments.
As described in section 3.3, monetary policy may have an influence on asset prices, such as
houses and shares. Related to the external finance premium, this can reduce the amount
of credit available for the firm and increase the costs of short-term funding. Again,
this can lead to increased probability of borrower default. Increased interest rates may
also indirectly aﬀect firms’ balance sheets. A higher interest rate may lower the overall
spending in the economy, thereby also reducing the demand for the firm’s products. In
turn, this may reduce the firm’s revenue. The reduction in revenue might erode the firm’s
net worth and credit-worthiness over time. Therefore, tighter policy may result in higher
default rates, lower banking profits, and larger share of non-performing loans (IMF, 2013).
3.4.2 Empirical Literature
Sengupta (2010) showed that tighter monetary policy in the Unites States after 2004
increased the debt service burden on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), leading to a
sharp rise in defaults of Alt-A mortgages8. By using loan-level data on securitized Alt-A
originations from 1998 to 2007, the data provides evidence that for most years in the
sample period, adjustable rate mortgages registered higher default rates9 than fixed rate
mortgages (FRM). Furthermore, by studying the percentage delinquent after the first
18 months, the diﬀerence was greater for ordinations between 2005 and 2007. Sengupta
(2010) suggests that the low interest rate environment during the early part of the decade
following a monetary tightening in the second half of 2004, might explain the rise in
default rates on adjustable interest rate mortgages.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) investigated empirical evidence of a link between monetary
policy and the financial position of firms, by studying the "coverage ratio" as a measure of
firms’ financial position.10 The results suggest that there is a close relationship between
this ratio and the federal funds rate. Consequently, an increase in the funds rate may lead
8Alt-A mortgages is a class of mortgage bank securities (typically a large pool of mortgages that are
used as collateral to issue securities) that involves loans to borrowers with good credit.
9Default on mortgages is in this paper is defined as a 90-day delinquency event at any point in the
repayment history.
10The ratio of interest payments by non-financial corporations to the sum of interest payments and
profits. Source: Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
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to a higher coverage ratio, meaning that higher interest rates depress the financial position
of firms. To get a clearer picture of the impact of monetary policy on the components
of firms’ cash flows, data from 1965 to 1994 from the U.S. is used to estimate a VAR-
model. The results show that a tightening of monetary policy squeezes firms’ cash flows.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) emphasize that the implications for economic behavior of
the firm will depend on the firms’ ability to smooth this drop. Firms that have relatively
poor access to credit markets will typically cut production and employment, as a response
to declining cash flow, while firms with good access will face less financial pressure.
3.5 Exchange Rate Channel
Over the past half-century, there has been an evolution of financial integration in the
world economy, and the financial openness is argued to be an irresistible long-run trend
(Rey, 2013). In a small open economy, monetary policy may have an impact on capital
flows and exchange rates. According to Mishkin (2001) a tighter monetary policy (higher
interest rates) relative to other countries means that investors may get a higher yield
on domestic assets relative to other countries, tending to make the domestic assets more
attractive. Increased demand for domestic assets might lead to an increased value of the
domestic currency. As a consequence, a tighter monetary policy may reduce the price
of imports, and reduce the demand for exports, which therefore might lead to a current
account deficit (IMF, 2013). A current account deficit is matched by net capital inflows,
as foreign investors build up claims in the domestic economy. Merrouche and Nier (2010)
describe several consequences of high capital inflows that might impose risks to financial
instability. High capital inflows may reduce the cost of wholesale funding for domestic
banks. This might lead banks to excessively borrow in foreign markets, and take on
additional leverage. As a consequence, the financial system may become more vulnerable,
as both national and international shocks may erode the repayment capacity of financial
intuitions. High capital inflows may also increase the total supply of credit in the domestic
economy, possibly causing asset prices to rise. Thus, through the exchange rate channel,
a higher monetary policy rate may lead to increased risks of financial instability.
Merrouche and Nier (2010) investigated the drivers on financial imbalances ahead of the
global financial crises, and argue that rising global imbalances (capital flows) might have
been a contributing factor. The panel data regressions are performed for OECD countries
over the period 1999 to 2007. The main result of the analysis shows that for small
advanced countries the net capital inflows (which may steam from a rise in the policy
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rate) can contribute to the build-up of financial imbalances, as measured by the ratio of
credit to deposits. Conversely, a loose monetary policy stance, can contribute to current
account surpluses and capital outflows that may fuel build-ups of financial imbalances
elsewhere in the world. The conclusions from the paper by Merrouche and Nier (2010)
are further supported in IMF (2013), where it is argued that the exchange rate channel
was particularly relevant ahead of the recent financial crisis. As an example, in Iceland the
high interest rate diﬀerential between foreign and domestic financial markets prior to the
crisis, led the banking sector in Iceland to excessively increase foreign funding, which fueled
capital inflows, and led to a sharp appreciation of the currency and overheating of the
economy. As a response, the central bank raised policy rates in order to reduce inflationary
pressures, but this attracted even more capital, generating an adverse feedback loop (IMF,
2013).
24
4 Evidence of a Risk-Taking Channel in Norway: An
Empirical Analysis
Although the model regarding banks’ risk-taking discussed in section 3.1 is simple, it
produces testable hypotheses about a possible relationship between banks’ risk-taking
and the monetary policy rate. Most of the theoretical implications in section 3.1 suggest
a negative relationship between banks’ risk-taking and the policy interest rate, but that
the strength of this relationship depends on the capitalization structure of the bank. In
this section, I present my approach to testing the predicted behavioral responses of banks
to changes in the monetary policy stance as implied by the model, and how these responses
depend on banks’ leverage. The analysis will be conducted using quarterly panel data of
163 individual Norwegian banks over the period 1995 to the second quarter of 2014.
In order to construct a measure of banks’ risk-taking behavior, I make use of an adminis-
trative record on banks’ and financial intermediaries’ characteristics (ORBOF) reported
to Norwegian authorities.11 The construction of this measure will be further explained in
section 4.1. The approach taken in the analysis is to investigate whether the three-month
NIBOR interest rate, as a proxy for Norwegian monetary policy, aﬀects the composition of
banks’ lending to diﬀerent risk weighted industries. If the theoretical predictions implied
by the model are of any relevance, then banks should invest in riskier industries when this
interest rate decreases.
4.1 The Risk Measure
Because there are possibly many factors determining risk, successfully identifying banks’
risk-taking is not straightforward. Given this empirical challenge, I have constructed a
risk measure, making use of data on banks’ losses on loans divided into nine defined
industries. The risk measure for a given bank in a given time period is defined as the
ratio of the sum of total risk-weighted lending to all the classified industries to its total
lending to the nine industries. Mathematically the risk-measure is given by the following
11In this setting, the authorities are Statistics Norway, Norges Bank and the Norwegian Financial
Supervisory Authority.
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formula:
yit =
9P
j=1
 jLitj
9P
j=1
Litj
, for all i, t (7)
where  j is the risk-weight associated with bank loans based on average historical losses
to industry j and Litj denotes loans from bank i to industry j in a given quarter t. The
interpretation of yit is that if bank i increases the portion of loans to higher risk-weighted
industries so that yit increases, this may indicate higher risk-taking.
To construct the risk-weights,  j, I make use of annual data on aggregate bank losses
from 1997 to 2013 reported to Norges Bank and the Norwegian Financial Supervisory
Authority, by all Norwegian banks excluding branches of foreign banks. Bank losses, are
in this particular case, defined as defaulted loans in the various industries as a percentage
of total lending to the respective industry. Defaulted loans are defined as loans where
payments due for more than 90 days are not made.12 I take the average over the whole
sample for each industry. This is in line with the definition proposed in Solheim and
Kragh-Sørensen (2014) who argue that data on historical losses give a good basis for
measuring the probability of losses on bank loans. The risk-weights, represented by the
average in each industry, are given in table 1. According to the data, the industry asso-
ciated with the highest risk-weight is the shipping sector. This is reasonable to expect,
because loans to the shipping sector are usually large and the sector is highly exposed
to disturbances in both the national and the international economy. A bit surprising,
following the same arguments, is that the oil and gas industry is associated with the
lowest risk-weight. However, one reason might be that oil companies are relatively large,
governments are often partly involved, and therefore, firms in this industry rarely default
on loans. Furthermore, in the period considered, 1997 to 2014, the oil sector has mainly
been growing, and therefore not been associated with loan losses.
The risk measure is not ideal and may capture other eﬀects than banks’ risk-taking.
Also, due to data limitations, an ex ante measure of banks’ risk-taking is not feasible to
construct. Ideally, we would have a measure of the ex ante risk-taking based on banks’
assessment of risk at the time the loan was made. When using an ex post risk measure,
12In the dataset, the definition of defaulted loans changes in 2010 where losses then are defined as loans
where payments due for more than 30 days are not made.
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Table 1: Average Percentage Losses on Bank Loans
Variable Risk-weight (mean)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0,5457
Extraction of oil and gas 0,0375
Manufacturing and mining industry 0,6388
Construction activities and water- and electricity supply 0,4245
Retail, accommodation and food service 0,5097
Real estate activities and other financial services 0,2297
Various tertiary industries 0,3882
Shipping 0,6863
Transportation and communicaton 0,5719
we might also capture the risk that banks never intended to take, and were just caught oﬀ
guard. The disadvantages and limitations of the risk-taking measure used in this thesis
will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.1.
4.2 Data Description
The main dataset used in this thesis is an administrative record including bank lending for
Norwegian registered financial institutions (ORBOF). The authorities in Norway request
banks to provide monthly and annual information on lending standards distinguishing
between diﬀerent types of loans. The dataset includes various variables on bank charac-
teristics related to banks’ equity, deposits, and corporate lending divided into respective
industries. The aggregated results from this self-reporting are published at the website
of Statistics Norway.13 However, the overall sample at the individual bank level is con-
fidential. The reporting is compulsory and applies to all banks, credit institutions and
other financial institutions registered in Norway, including branches of foreign banks and
financial institutions, as well as governmental lending institutions and Norges Bank. The
Norwegian corporate loan market is primary dominated by banks.14 Although the sample
covers the whole financial sector, I restrict the analysis to consider only banks and their
industrial lending.
13For data source: see appendix A.5.
14A chart of the division of gross domestic lending in Norway can be found in Norges Bank (2014b),
chart 2.
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All issuances of banks’ corporate loans are divided into diﬀerent industries based on
the Norwegian Standard Industrial Classification. This classification provides unique
definitions for industrial classification, and its primary objective is to provide rules and
guidelines to be used in Norway’s Oﬃcial statistics (SSB, 2008). The classification system
is revised every few years, because new industries appear and the structure of industries
changes. The system was revised in the mid of 2002 and 2009, but in this thesis the data
is transformed back to the SIC1994 classification. According to SSB (2008), the system
of classification aims at satisfying two criteria. First, the units classified in the same class
have to produce a significant share of total production that characterizes the group in
question. Second, as a whole, the units in an industrial subclass shall be as homogeneous
as possible with respect to the technical organization of production and the product’s
nature and field of utilization. Banks’ business loans are divided into nine industries:15
• Gross loans to agriculture, forestry and fishing.
• Gross loans to extraction of oil and gas.
• Gross loans to manufacturing and mining industry.
• Gross loans to construction activities and water- and electricity supply.
• Gross loans to retail, accommodation and food service.
• Gross loans to real estate activities and other financial services.
• Gross loans to shipping and pipelines.
• Gross loans to transportation and communication.
• Gross loans to various tertiary industries.
There are several challenges when analyzing data from a relatively long time-period, due
to potential changes in the banking structure and the number of operating banks. Between
1995 and 2014, several banks have merged and some banks have been renamed. In some
cases, when banks are renamed, they are reported twice. Because of the renaming, banks
are reported both as the "new" bank, and as the "old" bank with zero lending. In these
particular cases, I merge the observations. Banks that simply do not have any lending
15More details and explanations of the diﬀerent industries can be found in the appendix A.1.
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activity during the considered period are deleted from the dataset. Due to confidentiality,
the names of the aﬀected banks are not reported in the thesis.
The data on diﬀerent measures of individual banks’ capitalization levels are taken from the
ORBOF dataset, while the data used to construct risk-weights are taken from statistics
used in Norges Bank’s Financial Stability Report. Data on the three-month NIBOR
interest rate can be found at the online database of Norges Bank, while data on the gross
value added in the diﬀerent industries can be found at the online database of Statistics
Norway.16
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 yields the descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables, in-
cluding standard deviations, minimum and maximum values and mean values. The panel
is unbalanced. First, there seems to be suﬃcient variation both between and within the
included variables in the data set. High between variation supports the inclusion of bank
fixed eﬀects, controlling for observed and unobserved variables varying across banks, but
not time. The risk measure varies between 0.173 and 0.639 with an average risk of 0.4195
and a standard deviation of 0.0623.17
The summary statistics of the variables used in the construction of the dependent variable,
are reported in table 3. The bank loan data is reported quarterly at the aggregated
industry level for each bank. As seen in this table, the number of observations on the
loan data is varying across the diﬀerent industries. It is especially the observations on
loans to the shipping industry and the oil industry that are considerably lower than the
number of observations in the other industries. As mentioned earlier, banks’ loan losses are
defined as defaulted loans in the various industries as a percentage of total lending to the
respective industry. As seen in table 3, the standard deviations of some of these variables
are large. In addition, as seen from the minimum values, some of the observations take
negative values. The reason is that loans that previously were considered as defaulted,
starts repaying, and as a consequence are no longer considered as defaulted.
16For data sources: see appendix A.5.
17As seen from section 4.1, by construction the maximum value of the risk measure will always be
smaller than one.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Obs.
Risk measure Overall 0.4195 0.0623 0.1731 0.6391 N = 11027
Between 0.0542 0.2605 0.5239 n = 162
Within 0.0350 0.0851 0.6373 T-bar = 68.0279
3-month NIBOR (%) Overall 4.2365 1.9558 1.6698 8.0408 N = 12714
Between 0 4.2365 4.2365 n = 163
Within 1.9558 1.6698 8.0408 T-bar = 78
Tier-1 capital ratio Overall 0.1655 0.0645 0.0156 1.9540 N = 10544
Between 0.0536 0.0156 1.9540 n = 152
Within 0.0401 -0.0080 1.7799 T-bar = 69.37
Total capital ratio Overall 0.1726 0.0600 0.0306 1.9540 N = 10544
Between 0.0462 0.0840 0.3996 n = 152
Within 0.0411 -0.0009 1.7870 T-bar = 69.37
Leverage ratio Overall 0.1023 0.0409 0.0102 1.9667 N = 10544
Between 0.0300 0.0527 0.2258 n = 152
Within 0.6373 T-bar = 69.37
Bank total assets Overall 15.9887 87.92822 0.0201 1773.548 N = 11127
(mill NOK) Between 68.9089 0.0857 793.8638 n = 162
Within 49.9622 -640.1029 955.6727 T-bar = 68.6852
Value added Overall 0.0034 0.6798 -1.1256 1.4723 N = 12551
agriculture Between 0 0.0034 0.0034 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.6798 0.6798 -1.1256 1.4723 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0222 0.1252 -0.3260 0.3371 N = 12551
oil and gas Between 0 0.0222 0.0222 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.1252 -0.3260 0.3371 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0176 0.0710 -0.2045 0.2155 N = 12551
shipping Between 0 0.0176 0.0176 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0799 -0.2045 0.2155 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0090 0.0702 -0.1517 0.1431 N = 12551
manufacturing Between 0 0.0090 0.0090 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0702 -0.1517 0.1431 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0125 0.0813 -0.1069 0.1700 N = 12551
retail Between 0 0.01246 0.0125 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0813 -0.1069 0.1700 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0176 0.0800 -0.2045 0.2155 N = 12551
transportation Between 0 0.1759 0.0176 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0800 -0.2045 0.2155 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0205 0.0744 -0.1675 0.2096 N = 12551
financial services Between 0 0.0205 0.0205 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0744 -0.1675 0.2096 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0165 0.0734 -0.1651 0.1894 N = 12551
tertiary industries Between 0 0.0165 0.0165 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.0734 -0.1651 0.1894 T-bar = 77
Value added Overall 0.0169 0.1162 -0.2506 0.2612 N = 12551
water supply Between 0 0.0169 0.0169 n = 163
(growth rate) Within 0.1162 -0.2506 0.2612 T-bar = 77
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Table 3: Summary Statistics Variables Used in Construction of the Dependent Variable
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Obs.
Loans agriculture Overall 368.038 1299.55 0 21948.63 N = 10597
(mill NOK) Between 1072.71 0 9436 n = 159
Within 644.28 -7103 12880.67 T-bar = 66.6478
Loans oil and gas Overall 323.89 906.32 0 8418.02 N = 2199
(mill NOK) Between 427.94 0 2988.31 n = 92
Within 570.82 -2228.25 5753.60 T-bar = 23.90
Loans manufacturing Overall 397.37 2027.64 0 34151.35 N = 10801
(Mill NOK) Between 1731.056 1.28 17109.77 n = 159
Within 878.20 -10033.92 17438.96 T-bar = 67.93
Loans water supply Overall 380.78 2259.27 0 54037.8 N = 10845
(mill NOK) Between 1522.87 1.24 16789.75 n = 160
Within 1580.21 -14700.49 37628.84 T-bar = 67.7813
Loans retail Overall 442.89 2040.80 0 31974.72 N = 10900
(Mill NOK) Between 1798.98 0.02 19436.6 n = 162
Within 809.61 -9964.71 12981.01 T-bar =
Loans shipping Overall 1390.27 4042.56 0 31288.68 N = 2573
(Mill NOK) Between 2281.4 0 16484.45 n = 84
Within 2118.90 -7856.76 16194.5 T-bar = 30.63
Loans transportation Overall 242.84 1121.62 0 19006.72 N = 10248
and communication Between 917.34 0.47 8575.28 n = 161
(Mill NOK) Within 564.85 .8332.44 10674.28 T-bar = 63.65
Loans financial services Overall 2227.12 11397.32 0 181144.2 N = 10862
(Mill NOK) Between 8848.94 0 91751.61 n = 162
Within 6428.82 -69177.34 91619.67 T-bar = 67.05
Loans various tertiary industries Overall 170.90 701.56 0 11731 N = 10697
(Mill NOK) Between 583.18 0.42 5936.38 n = 161
Within 363.43 -4277.70 5965.52 T-bar = 66.44
Loss agriculture overall 0.546 1.716 -2.17 6.08 17
Loss oil and gas overall 0.038 0.76 -1.668 1.7 17
Loss manufacturing overall 0.639 0.498 -0.28 1.75 17
Loss water supply overall 0.424 0.422 -0.18 1.72 17
Loss retail overall 0.51 0.344 0.085 1.376 17
Loss shipping overall 0.686 0.741 -0.09 2.1 17
Loss transportation and communication overall 0.572 0.544 -0.201 1.434 17
Loss financial services overall 0.23 0.394 -0.192 1.55 17
Loss various tertiary industries overall 0.388 0.426 -0.111 1.57 17
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4.3 The Econometric Model
Again, I will make use of quarterly panel data including 163 individual banks over the
period 1995 to the second quarter of 2014, to test the predictions from the theoretical
section regarding the risk-taking channel. The aim is to investigate the notion that mon-
etary policy aﬀects the quality of banks’ balance sheets, by analyzing the eﬀect of the
NIBOR interest rate on the composition of banks’ lending to risk-weighted industries in
Norway. Based on the set-up of Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013), the baseline econometric model
takes the functional form of equation 8. Banks are represented by subscript i, quarters
by subscript t and industries by subscript j.
yi,t = ↵i+ 1it+ 2Ki,t 1+ Ki,t 1it+ 3Xi,t+ 4yi,t 1+ 5it 1+
9X
j=1
 5+jZj,t+ "i,t (8)
yi,t is the risk measure for a given bank i in a given quarter t, it is the three-month NIBOR
interest rate and "i,t is the error term.18 A full set of bank fixed eﬀects, ↵i, is also included
to control for unobserved bank characteristics that vary across banks, but not time. This
variable will capture some of the eﬀects from omitted variables that diﬀer between banks.
The lagged risk measure is included because it may be a good proxy for other shocks to
banks’ risk-taking that are serial correlated (Romer and Romer, 2010). Since the data is
quarterly, it is reasonable to assume that the previous quarter’s interest rate is correlated
with risk-taking in the next period. Therefore, in order to capture lagged responses of the
NIBOR interest rate on banks’ risk-taking, a lag of the NIBOR interest rate is included.
Because an increase in the dependent variable may indicate higher risk-taking, or lower
quality of banks’ lending, the main coeﬃcient of interest,  1, is expected to be negative.
Ki,t 1 is the capital-asset ratio (the inverse of bank leverage) for bank i at the end of quar-
ter t  1.19 As pointed out in section 3.1, banks’ risk-taking is expected to be dependent
on banks’ capitalization levels. In the data set, the capital asset ratios are measured by
end of quarter. For this reason, it is the previous quarters’ capital ratio that is included
as a control variable.
Xi,t is a set of bank specific control variables not including bank leverage. The motivation
to control for bank characteristics is that lending behavior may vary across banks and
18As discussed in section 2.3, previous studies support the use of the three month NIBOR interest rate
as a proxy for key policy rates.
19The capital-asset ratio is defined as the Tier-1 capital to risk weighted assets in period t  1.
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time. Following Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013), a measure of bank size, the growth rate in bank
total assets, is included in the regression, since it can be expected that larger banks have
other risk-preferences compared to smaller banks.20 Controlling for bank size reduces a
possible omitted variable bias in the interest rate coeﬃcient, as changes in the growth
rate of total assets and interest rates is likely to be correlated. I also include dummy
variables for diﬀerent types of banks, since these often specialize in diﬀerent segments
of financial markets. I run the regressions in subsamples specified by three bank types,
(i) savings banks, (ii) commercial banks and (iii) branches of foreign banks.21 The
motivation for splitting the sample is that in the Norwegian banking market, commercial
banks are the largest banks measured by bank total assets, and in addition, some of
the commercial banks are accounted as the largest corporate loan originators (Norges
Bank, 2014b). Therefore, splitting the sample might give additional information.
As described in the section 3.1, the strength of the eﬀect of monetary policy on banks’
risk-taking may depend on banks’ capitalization levels. As advanced in the simple model
by Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2010), due to the risk-shifting eﬀect, the strength of the relationship
may be weaker for banks with higher leverage. Therefore, in equation 8, I have included an
interaction term, Ki,t 1it, between the interest rate and the Tier-1 capital ratio, as a proxy
for banks’ capitalization levels. The estimated coeﬃcient,  ˆ, is expected to be negative,
as this would imply a stronger negative eﬀect of higher interest rates for well-capitalized
banks, compared to lower capitalized banks.
I also control for the macroeconomic environment by including industry specific control
variables, where Zj,t is the gross value added in each of the nine industries considered.22
As an example, increased growth rates in the oil industry is also likely to increase demand
for loans in this industry, which might aﬀect our dependent variable. Therefore, as an
attempt to disentangle the eﬀect of monetary policy conditions on banks’ credit supply
and other economic features, the growth rates in the diﬀerent industries are included as
control variables.
20In section 3.1 we discussed the time-consistency problem for central banks. It is reasonable to assume
that larger banks might expect more bail-out by governments, since these banks impose a larger risk to
financial stability.
21The division of diﬀerent bank types is based on the concession register from the Financial Supervisory
Authority in Norway.
22Gross value added is the sum of firms sales minus value of input factors.
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4.3.1 An Alternative Specification
An alternative specification is shown in the equation below, where time fixed eﬀects are
included.23 The time fixed eﬀects are expected to influence all banks since they vary at the
country level. The reason for not including time fixed eﬀects in equation 8 is that when
time fixed eﬀects are included, other variables that vary at the national level are dropped.
This also includes the NIBOR interest rate, which varies over time, but is the same for
all banks. Nevertheless, including time fixed eﬀects enables us to check the robustness
of the estimated interaction between the interest rate and banks’ capitalization levels
in the previous specification. Time fixed eﬀects will capture changes in economy-wide
conditions, such as current and future expectations of GDP growth, inflation, exchange
rates and other overall shocks to the economy, that may be related to the NIBOR interest
rate. This may reduce the potential inconsistency of the estimator of the interaction term
in the above specification. The alternative specification including time fixed eﬀects,  t,
and bank fixed eﬀects, ↵i, is represented in the below equation. In this specification, the
main coeﬃcient of interest is  , which still is expected to be negative.
yi,t = ↵i +  t +  2Ki,t 1 +  Ki,t 1it +  3Xi,t +  4yi,t 1 + "i,t (9)
4.4 Estimation Issues, Reversed Causality and Specification Tests
An important assumption underlying the identification approach is that monetary policy
authorities do not respond to banks’ risk-taking when setting the key policy rate. If the
central bank reacts to financial stability considerations, which in this case is increased risk-
taking, there will be potential reversed causality issues. Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) argue
that prior to the financial crisis, financial stability considerations played a limited role in
the setting of the monetary policy rate. In line with the Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013) paper,
this thesis is largely based on the period before the financial crisis, and it therefore seems
reasonable to assume that the key policy rate was set without to much influence from
the financial stability environment. In addition, the primary objective of the Norwegian
central bank is to set the key policy rate to achieve the inflation target. Furthermore, the
Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority is the main responsible authority considering
financial stability issues. For these reasons, it is assumed that such a reversed causality
problem is of limited importance.
23Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012) refer to this model as the various fixed eﬀects model,
since both bank fixed eﬀects and time fixed eﬀects are included.
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It has long been recognized in time-series analysis that estimated regression relationships
of macroeconomic flow data can be distorted by non-stationarity in the data. Therefore,
what appears to be a strong estimated relation can be entirely spurious due to underly-
ing characteristics of the time-series process rather than actual connections among the
variables (Green, 2008). A stationary variable is a variable that is non-explosive, not
trending or wandering aimlessly around (a random walk) without returning to its mean.
Checking for unit roots can test the presence of non-stationarity for all the included vari-
ables, because a shock to a variable with unit roots will have permanent eﬀects (Hill,
Griﬃths and Lim, 2012). By using the Dickey-Fuller test for panel data, I find strong
evidence that the log of bank total assets is the only variable with presence of unit roots.
This is taken account for by taking the first diﬀerence, which still gives a valid economic
interpretation. Conducting the same test for the new variable, which is now the growth
rate in total assets, I find strong evidence that the variable is stationary. The results from
the Dickey-Fuller tests are included in the appendix A.2.
Another important question when it comes to panel data is the question of whether to
pool or not to pool the data. In the pooled regression model, it is assumed that there
is no observed or unobserved heterogeneity between the individual banks, and that the
least square estimator including a common intercept is consistent (Green, 2008). On the
other hand, the fixed eﬀects approach takes the constant term to be group-specific in
the regression model. We can test for bank fixed eﬀects by running an OLS regression
with dummies for each bank, and then conduct a general F-test under the null hypothesis
that the constant terms are all equal. Under the null hypothesis, the pooled regression
estimates provide consistent and eﬃcient estimates of the common intercept and slope
coeﬃcient (Green, 2008). In this thesis, however, it is reasonable to assume that there
exist heterogeneous eﬀects between banks. This is further supported in table 4 and table
5, which yield the test results from the F-test. As we can see from these tables, the null
hypothesis is rejected for all the included regressions. Likewise, in some of the included
regressions the absence of random bank eﬀects is rejected by the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier test for random eﬀects.24 Furthermore, I also test for random versus fixed eﬀects
by using a Hausman test. The results strongly suggest the fixed eﬀects approach in all the
included regressions. As a result, all the reported regressions in this thesis are including
individual bank fixed eﬀects.
24Unlike the fixed eﬀects approach, in the random eﬀects approach it is assumed that the unobserved
individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the included variables (Green, 2008)
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I also test each of the regressions for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error
terms. All the test results show strong evidence for both, and therefore, all the standard
errors are clustered by bank at the quarterly level.25 Test results are reported in table 4
and table 5. In the last specification equation, time fixed eﬀects are also included. When
I test for time fixed eﬀects, I find that it is strongly suggested to include such in the
regressions, see table 6.
Table 4: Specification Test Results of Regressions Reported in Table 7 and Table 8
Model Fixed eﬀects Random eﬀects Fixed vs Random Autocorrelation Heteroskedasticity
Standard F-test Breush-Pagan LM Hausman-test
H0: No Fixed H0: No Random H0: No systematic H0: No serial H0 :No
eﬀects eﬀects diﬀerence correlation heteroskedasticity
statacmd: statacmd: statacmd: hausman statacmd: statacmd:
test xttest0 fixed random xtserial xttest3
Model 1 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
0.000 0.000 -13.34 0.000 0.000
Model 2 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
0.000 0.000 -2.12 0.000 0.000
Model 3 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
0.0000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Column 1 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
Commercial 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Column 2 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
Savings 0.0015 1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Column 3 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
Foregin 0.0000 1.0000 0.0016 0.000 0.000
25Cluster standard errors will take care of the idiosyncratic autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in
the error terms.
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Table 5: Specification Test Results of Regressions Reported in Table 9
Model Fixed eﬀects Random eﬀects Fixed vs Random Autocorrelation Heteroskedasticity
Standard F-test Breush-Pagan LM Hausman-test
H0: No Fixed H0: No Random H0: No systematic H0: No serial H0 :No
eﬀects eﬀects diﬀerence correlation heteroskedasticity
statacmd: statacmd: statacmd: hausman statacmd: statacmd:
test xttest0 fixed random xtserial xttest3
Column 1 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
Tier-1 capital 0.0000 1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
interaction
Column 2 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
Total capital 0.0000 1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
interaction
Column 3 p-value p-value chi2(1) p-value p-value
"Inverse 0.0000 1.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
leverage"
interaction
Table 6: Testing for Time Fixed Eﬀects for the Regressions Reported in Table 10
Model Test Statistics of a Standard F-test (statacmd: testparm) p-value
H0: No Time-Fixed Eﬀects
Column 1 F (76, 151) = 14.70 0.0000
Column 2 F (76, 151) = 14.52 0.0000
Column 3 F (76, 151) = 14.59 0.0000
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5 Empirical Results
In this section, I will present the main results from the regression analysis described in the
previous section, regarding the relationship between short-term interest rates and banks’
risk-taking, and the eﬀect of banks’ capitalization on this relationship.
5.1 Empirical Results Baseline Regression
Table 7, reports the results from estimating the baseline model, equation 8. In this table
all the models include bank fixed eﬀects, and the standard errors are clustered quarterly at
the bank level. In model 1, neither bank specific nor industry specific control variables are
included in the regression. The results from this estimation suggest that a one percent
increase in the NIBOR interest rate is positively associated with risk-taking, and the
estimated coeﬃcient,  ˆ1, equals 0.00674, which is also highly statistically significant.
A positive relationship between banks’ risk-taking and interest rates is not consistent
with most of the theoretical suggestions of the risk-taking channel proposed in section
3.1. However, as we will see, the eﬀect varies across models including diﬀerent control
variables, as well as across diﬀerent bank types.
In model 2, when industry specific and bank specific controls are included, the estimated
interest rate coeﬃcient remains approximately the same. Note however, that the estimate
in model 2 is slightly more precise than in model 1, as the standard error falls. Evident
from this model is that the estimated coeﬃcient of the tier-1 capital ratio,  ˆ2, seems to be
positively associated with risk-taking. This would imply that lower leverage is associated
with higher risk-taking, and the estimated eﬀect is therefore not consistent with the
theoretical literature. Following the argument by De Nicolo et al. (2010), banks with
more "skin-in-the-game" or lower leverage, invest more prudently compared to higher
leveraged banks. Intuitively, an explanation might be that banks with lower leverage
might tolerate higher losses, and therefore takes higher risk.
In model 3, when a lag of the dependent variable and interest rate variables are added,
the estimated interest rate coeﬃcient,  ˆ1, reduces prominently. Furthermore, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable is highly significant and also has about
the same magnitude as the common autoregressive coeﬃcient.26 Therefore, including
26When running an xtregar regression, correcting for the AR(1) serial correlation in the disturbances
with no lagged risk-taking measure included, the AR(1) coeﬃcient has about the same magnitude as the
estimated coeﬃcient of the lagged risk measure,  ˆ5, as the estimated AR(1) coeﬃcient equals, ⇢ = 0.9591.
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the lagged dependent variable will likely take care of the serial correlation in the distur-
bances.27 As a result, I will proceed by including the lagged risk-taking measure. In this
model the estimated coeﬃcient,  ˆ1, turns negative and is also highly statistically signifi-
cant. Hence, a one percent increase in the NIBOR interest rate is negatively associated
with banks’ risk-taking, and the estimated coeﬃcient,  ˆ1, equals -0.0039. The estimation
results in this model imply that, ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between
interest rates and banks’ risk-taking. This may be interpreted as the quality of banks’
lending improves when the interest rate increases, which is consistent with the theoretical
suggestions in section 3.1 and previous studies in other countries. Clearly, from table 7,
the results in the three columns indicate that the relationship between the short-term in-
terest rate and banks’ risk-taking is ambiguous, and dependent on the inclusion of diﬀerent
control variables, as the estimated coeﬃcient,  ˆ1, varies between -0.00039 and 0.00674.
27As seen in table 4, when testing for serial correlation in the error terms by using the xtserial test,
H0 is rejected, indicating that there still is serial correlation in the disturbances. Therefore, the standard
errors are still clustered quarterly at the bank level.
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Table 7: Bank Risk-Taking and the 3-Month NIBOR Interest Rate
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All banks All banks All banks
3-month NIBOR 0.00674*** 0.00656*** -0.00039**
(0.00040) (0.00038) (0.00018)
Growth rate bank size 0.00461 0.00359
(0.00757) (0.00520)
Tier-1 capital ratio (t  1) 0.07780* 0.00957*
(0.04326) (0.00539)
Risk measure (t  1) 0.94872***
(0.00631)
3-month NIBOR (t  1) 0.00076***
(0.00019)
Constant 0.39063*** 0.37824*** 0.01762***
(0.00172) (0.00758) (0.00243)
R-sqr 0.137 0.184 0.917
Degrees of freedom 161 151 151
Observations 11027 10357 10352
Bank fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Industry specific controls no yes yes
Clustered standard errors yes yes yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In model 1, the NIBOR interest rate is the only included explanatory variable. In model 2, bank
specific and industry specific variables are included. In model 3, a lag of the dependent variable
and the interest variable are also included. Bank size is measured by log of total assets. Dependent
variable: Risk measure. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Table 8 yields the results from regressions on diﬀerent subsamples of bank types. In this
table, bank specific and industry specific controls are included as well as the lagged depen-
dent and lagged interest rate variables. In column 1, the sample is restricted to include
commercial banks. The results indicate that a one percent increase in the interest rate is
negatively associated with banks’ risk-taking, and the estimated interest rate coeﬃcient
equals -0.0018, which is also highly statistically significant. Compared with the results
from model 3 in table 7, when restricting the sample to commercial banks, the estimated
eﬀect of a higher interest rate is greater. In addition, the estimated coeﬃcient of the
Tier-1 capital ratio is negative and highly statistically significant. A negative estimated
coeﬃcient on proxies for banks’ capitalization levels indicates that lower leverage is asso-
ciated with lower risk-taking, which is consistent with the "skin-in-the-game" argument
in De Nicolo et al. (2010). In column 2 and column 3, the results from regressions on
subsamples of savings banks and branches of foreign banks are reported, respectively.
In both columns, the estimated interest rate coeﬃcients are negative, but statistically
insignificant even at a ten percent level. Moreover, for both bank types, the estimated
coeﬃcients of the tier-1 capital ratio are positive, and statistically significant.
As seen in table 8, running regressions on diﬀerent subsamples of banks seems to yield
diﬀerent results, in both the estimated interest rate and capital ratio coeﬃcients. A po-
tential explanation might be that commercial banks, which are the largest operator in the
Norwegian corporate lending market28, may have more sensitive investment strategies to
diﬀerent shocks, when deciding the composition of their loan portfolio. Also, branches of
foreign banks are regulated subject to their home country’s requirements, which might
also explain the diﬀerences (Ministry of Finance Norway, 2011). Although the estimated
interest rate coeﬃcients diﬀer in magnitude and in statistically significance, they all in-
dicate a negative relationship between banks’ risk-taking and short-term interest rates.
28Source: chart 1.5 in Norges Bank (2014b) page 11.
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Table 8: Bank Risk-Taking and the 3-Month NIBOR Interest Rate for Diﬀerent Bank Types
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
Commercial banks Savings banks Foreign banks
3-month NIBOR -0.00180** -0.00024 -0.00075
(0.00068) (0.00018) (0.00158)
Growth rate bank size 0.02945*** -0.00679** 0.01067
(0.00670) (0.00313) (0.02667)
Tier-1 capital ratio (t  1) -0.01427*** 0.02240*** 0.06420*
(0.00448) (0.00588) (0.02290)
Risk measure (t  1) 0.88468*** 0.95404*** 0.70337***
(0.03631) (0.00570) (0.06220)
3-month NIBOR (t  1) 0.00270*** 0.00058*** 0.00021
(0.00091) (0.00019) (0.00129)
Contant 0.04032*** 0.01365*** 0.11517**
(0.01297) (0.00192) (0.02693)
R-sqr 0.859 0.925 0.660
Degrees of freedom 16 130 3
Observations 816 9382 154
Bank fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Industry specific controls yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors yes yes yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In this table, both bank specific and industry specific control variables are included, as well as a lag
of the dependent variable and the NIBOR interest rate.
In column 1, only commercial banks are included, in column 2, only savings banks are included, and
in column 3, only branches of foreign banks are included. Bank size is measured by log of total assets.
Dependent variable: Risk measure. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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As shown in the simple model in section 3.1, we might observe diﬀerences in banks’ risk-
taking responses following from an increase in the monetary policy rate, depending on
banks’ capitalization levels. In table 9, the regressions in all columns include an interaction
term between the interest rate and diﬀerent proxies for banks’ capitalization levels. The
focus is now on the coeﬃcient of the interaction term,  Ki,t 1rt, which is expected to
be negative. This is consistent with the simple model in section 3.1, as a negative sign
of the estimated interaction term coeﬃcient,  ˆ, would indicate a stronger negative eﬀect
of an increased interest rate on banks’ risk-taking for well-capitalized banks. Column 1
yields the estimation results when including an interaction term between the tier-1 capital
ratio and the NIBOR interest rate. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and statistically
significant at a ten percent level. I also check the robustness of this result by estimating
the coeﬃcients of interaction terms for other proxies of banks’ capitalization levels. In
column 2, an interaction term between the total capital ratio and the interest rate is
included. The total capital ratio is the regulatory capital (tier-1 plus tier-2 capital) to
risk-weighted assets (Norges Bank, 2014b). The estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction is
still positive and highly statistically significant. In column 3, the "inverse leverage ratio"
is included as a proxy for banks’ capitalization levels. The "inverse leverage ratio" is in
this case defined as the tier-1 capital to total assets (Norges Bank, 2014b). The estimated
eﬀect remains positive, but is now statistically insignificant, even at a ten percent level.
As seen from table 9, the estimated coeﬃcients of the diﬀerent interaction terms between
banks’ capitalization levels and short-term interest rates do not confirm the theoretical
suggestions in section 3.1. Given a negative relationship between interest rates and banks’
risk-taking, a positive estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction terms imply that the negative
relationship is less pronounced for banks with lower leverage, which does not support the
risk-shifting eﬀect described in the simple model. Although the estimated coeﬃcients for
the three proxies of banks’ capitalization levels are not consistent with the model, the
estimation results are robust across the diﬀerent measures. The estimated interaction
eﬀect is positive and approximately equal, irrespective of the proxy of capitalization used.
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Table 9: Bank Risk-Taking and the 3-Month NIBOR Interest Rate Including Interaction Terms
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
All banks All banks All banks
3-month NIBOR -0.00078*** -0.00088*** -0.00062**
(0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00026)
Growth rate bank size 0.00401 0.00422 0.00218
(0.00512) (0.00507) (0.00559)
Tier-1 capital ratio (t  1) -0.00112
(0.00712)
Tier-1 capital ratio*NIBOR 0.00235*
(0.00122)
Total capital ratio (t  1) -0.00517
(0.00658)
Total capital ratio*NIBOR 0.00290**
(0.00122)
"Inverse leverage ratio" (t  1) 0.02292
(0.01463)
"Inverse leverage ratio"*NIBOR 0.00173
(0.00195)
Risk measure (t  1) 0.94832*** 0.94908*** 0.94486***
(0.00638) (0.00632) (0.00680)
3-month NIBOR (t  1) 0.00076*** 0.00075*** 0.00077***
(0.00019) (0.00019) (0.00019)
Constant 0.01954*** 0.01991*** 0.01868***
(0.00273) (0.00277) (0.00264)
R-squard 0.917 0.917 0.917
Degrees of freedom 151 151 151
Observations 10352 10352 10352
Bank fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Industry specific controls yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors yes yes yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In this table, all control variables in equation 8 is included. Bank size is measured by log of total
assets. In column 1, an interaction term between the tier-1 capital ratio and the NIBOR interest
rate is included. In column 2, an interaction term between the total capital ratio and the NIBOR
interest rate is included, and in column 3, an interaction term between the "inverse leverage ratio"
and the NIBOR interest rate is included. Dependent variable: Risk-taking measure. Standard errors
are reported in brackets.
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5.2 Empirical Results - Including Time Fixed Eﬀects
Table 10 yields the results from estimating the various fixed eﬀects model, specified in
equation 9, where both time fixed eﬀects and bank fixed eﬀects are included. The coeﬃ-
cient of interest is still the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between the interest rate and
banks’ capitalization levels. As explained in section 4.3.1, the NIBOR interest rate is not
included in this specification because the it varies over time, but not across banks, and
will therefore be captured in the time fixed eﬀects. As seen from this table, the estimated
coeﬃcients of the three diﬀerent interaction terms are positive. However, it is only the
interaction term between the total capital ratio and the interest rate that is statistically
significant at a ten percent level. It should be noted that the estimated coeﬃcients of
the diﬀerent interactions between interest rates and banks’ capital ratios in table 9 and
10 are very similar, which suggests that the baseline estimated interaction coeﬃcients are
robust to controlling for economy-wide variation that is not captured by the short-term
interest rate, as argued by Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013).
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Table 10: Bank Risk-Taking and the 3-Month NIBOR Interest Rate Including Time Fixed
Eﬀects
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
All banks All banks All banks
Tier-1 capital ratio (t  1) -0.00780
(0.00475)
Tier-1 capital ratio*NIBOR 0.00153
(0.00103)
Total capital ratio (t  1) -0.01050**
(0.00479)
Total capital ratio*NIBOR 0.00200*
(0.00111)
"Inverse leverage ratio" (t  1) -0.00763
(0.01023)
"Inverse leverage ratio"*NIBOR 0.00194
(0.00174)
Growth rate bank size 0.00330 0.00342 0.00291
(0.00385) (0.00384) (0.00399)
Risk measure (t  1) 0.90165*** 0.90153*** 0.90173***
(0.00917) (0.00917) (0.00915)
Constant 0.03819*** 0.03860*** 0.03769***
(0.00366) (0.00365) (0.00370)
R-sqr 0.930 0.930 0.930
Degrees of freedom 151 151 151
Observations 10352 10352 10352
Bank fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Time fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Clustered standard errors yes yes yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
In this table, all control variables are included, also a lag of the NIBOR interest rate and a lag of the
dependent variable.Bank size is measured by log of total assets.
In column 1, an interaction term between the tier-1 capital ratio and the NIBOR interest rate is
included. In column 2, an interaction term between the total capital ratio and the NIBOR interest
rate is included. In column 3 an interaction term between the "inverse leverage ratio" and the NIBOR
interest rate is included. Dependent variable: Risk-taking measure. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. The quarterly time dummies are not included in the output.
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5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Limitations of the Analysis
As pointed out in earlier sections, there might be several potential drawbacks and limi-
tations of the empirical analysis. In this section, I will present and discuss some of these
concerns.
An important assumption underlying the empirical strategy is that the average of the
percentage bank losses gives a good indication of the risk that banks consider when
deciding the composition of their lending portfolios. However, this assumption might
fail for several reasons. First, as seen in table 3, there is a lot of variation in the loan
default data. This can also be seen from the charts in the appendix A.3. The problem
related to the variation in bank loan losses, is that the averages might not represent the
risk that a bank considers in a given time when deciding to supply a loan. To illustrate,
suppose that a representative bank when deciding to supply a loan, considers losses in
the two preceding years as the indicator of risk. In some of the industries, there have
been several periods with substantial bank losses for some periods of time. Therefore,
this bank may invest in other industries associated with lower losses during the recent
periods. However, due to the high variation, the latter industries still might be associated
with high average risk. Consequently, according to the measure used in the analysis, the
bank’s risk-taking behavior has rather increased than decreased. Nevertheless, it may be
reasonable to assume that banks are more long sighted, and as a consequence, the overall
averages might give a good indication of risks considered by banks.
Second, as mentioned earlier, Solheim and Kragh-Sørensen (2014) argue that the data
on historical average losses give a good basis for measuring the probability of losses on
bank loans. However, a potential concern, also advanced in Solheim and Kragh-Sørensen
(2014), is that the data (over the period 1997 to 2013) do not include any serious banking
crisis. It seems reasonable to assume, that losses in a crisis will diﬀer from losses in nor-
mal periods. As a result, the risk weights used in this thesis, might be misleading as the
averages not including any banking crisis, might be diﬀerent from averages including a
banking crisis. Third, another concern following from the way of defining a risk measure
in this thesis is that there might be other factors aﬀecting banks’ perception of risk in
an industry than previous losses. For example, expected future demand for an industry’s
products can possibly also have an influence on the assessment of risks associated with
a given industry. However, it is reasonable to assume that these considerations possibly
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diﬀer largely between banks, and therefore, this concern may not be easily addressed.
Fourth and finally, another concern related to the risk measure is the potential presence
of negative correlation between the risk weights. If the losses in the diﬀerent industries
are negatively correlated, it might be that a risk-averse bank hedge the risk in its portfolio
by supplying loans to two negatively correlated industries. I therefore check the correla-
tion between the risk weights in all nine industries. The correlation matrix shows that,
with one exception, the correlations between all industries are positive.29 The exception
is the correlation between the shipping industry and the agricultural industry, but the
correlation is fairly small. I therefore do not consider this issue as an important drawback
with the empirical analysis.
As illustrated above, there are several potential drawbacks concerning the construction
of the banks’ risk-taking measure. A way of checking for robustness of the results and
address some of the above concerns is to use the risk-weights defined by DnB, a large
Norwegian bank, reported in the paper by Solheim and Kragh-Sørensen (2014). Due to
both limited data and time, this is not further explored in this thesis.30
The aggregation of the loan data at the industry level for each bank might also have
implications for the estimated results. It might be that banks rely more heavily on firm
characteristics, rather than industry characteristics when deciding to supply loans. For
example, it is reasonable to expect that firms in a given industry diﬀer in their character-
istics associated with risks, observable for banks. A way of addressing the relevance of this
issue could be to run the regressions of subsamples of local banks. Intuitively, it might be
that local banks compared to national banks in a larger degree rely on firm characteristics
instead of the overall industry characteristics. Another issue is the possible measurement
errors in the data, a well-known problem related to using administrative records. The
ORBOF data is self-reported by banks, and it might be that banks wrongly report their
characteristics. However, if these errors are not systemic and only aﬀecting the dependent
variable, this will not cause problems with the estimated coeﬃcient (Studenmund, 2006).
An important assumption in the empirical analysis is that the NIBOR interest rate is a
good proxy for the stance of monetary policy. In a paper by Bernhardsen (2012) it was
shown that the key policy rates had a broad impact in the Norwegian money market. As
29The correlation matrix can be found in the appendix A.6.
30The industrial classification used in Solheim and Kragh-Sørensen (2014) is not the same as used in
this thesis, and it would required a lot of time to transform the risk-weights to the same classification
standard.
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mentioned earlier, when including time fixed eﬀects, the NIBOR interest rate is omitted
from the regression as it vary at the economy-wide level. Therefore, it might be that
instead of the NIBOR interest rate, the banks’ deposit rates could potentially be a good
proxy for the key policy rates since these varies at the bank level, and therefore could
be included in the alternative specification. However, this relies on the assumption of a
positive pass-through from the key policy rates to banks’ deposit rates. In addition, such a
strategy would introduce new endogeneity problems since the deposit rates could depend
on risk-taking. Another concern following from the econometric specification is that it
can be diﬃcult to separate the eﬀects of monetary policy conditions and other economic
features on banks’ risk-taking. It might be that in periods of low economic growth in
some industries, demand for loans in these industries are lower, which might aﬀect the
composition of banks’ portfolios. Fully controlling for these issues is a challenge that
is not easily resolved. However, including time fixed eﬀects controlling for time varying
observed and unobserved variables, and including the growth rates in the industry specific
gross value added, might control for this demand eﬀect.
The goal of empirical studies in economics is to establish causal relationships, thus how
changes in one variable causes a change in another variable (Wooldrigde, 2002). Therefore,
simply finding two variables to be correlated is rarely enough. For nearly half a century,
there has been a widespread consensus that the best kind of non-experimental data for
making causal inference is longitudinal data (Allison, 2005). In panel data, it is possible
to take care of some of the individual heterogeneity that varies across individuals but not
time. Also, it is possible to take care of omitted variables that varies across time but is
aﬀecting all individuals. However, there still might be other types of omitted variables,
or other issues regarding the empirical strategy, that erodes the possibility to establish a
causal relationship.
5.3.2 Discussion and Policy Implications
To summarize, the estimated eﬀect of the short-term interest rate on banks’ risk-taking
varies, and is not stable when including diﬀerent control variables. As seen in table 7, the
baseline estimation results not including any controls indicate that, ceteris paribus, there
is a positive relationship between banks’ risk-taking and the three-month NIBOR interest
rate, as a proxy for monetary policy interest rates. However, when the suggested controls
are included, the estimated relationship between banks’ risk-taking and interest rates
becomes negative, which is consistent with the predictions of the literature described in
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section 3.1. Thus, the quality of banks’ issuance of loans improves when the interest rate
increases. However, the various estimated interest rate coeﬃcients are quite small, varying
between -0.00024 including only savings banks to -0.0018 when only including commercial
banks. Therefore, although the estimated coeﬃcients are statistically significant, the
economic significance of the eﬀect seems modest.
Moreover, before estimation I expected a negative estimated coeﬃcient of the interac-
tion terms for diﬀerent proxies of banks’ capitalization levels and the short-term interest
rate. When the estimated relationship between the interest rate and banks’ risk-taking
is negative, a negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term would imply a stronger nega-
tive relationship for higher capitalized banks compared to banks with lower capitalization
levels. This is consistent with the risk-shifting eﬀect suggested in section 3.1. At the
total opposite, the estimated coeﬃcients of the interaction terms were positive for a range
of measures of banks’ capitalization, which was robust to the inclusion of time fixed ef-
fects. This indicates a weaker negative relationship for well-capitalized banks, or banks
with lower leverage. Again, an alternative interpretation of this result may be that well
capitalized banks have more capacity to carry risk.
The aim of the empirical analysis was to investigate whether there exist evidence of a
negative relationship between the NIBOR interest rate (as a proxy for the monetary
policy stance) and Norwegian banks’ risk-taking. The analysis suggests that, when the
proposed controls are included, there is evidence of such a negative relationship. To the
extent that the proposed specifications shed a correct light on the possible existence of a
risk-taking channel in the Norwegian banking market, the estimation results would suggest
that the central bank should take these considerations into account in the monetary policy
decision. As the section above also clearly indicates, there are several potential drawbacks
with the analysis that need to be taken care of. In addition, it does not follow immediately
that a potential eﬀect of policy rates on banks’ risk-taking is unintended. An extension of
the empirical analysis could be to test whether the relationship strengthens when interest
rates are held low for extended periods, as done in both Maddaloni and Peydro (2010)
and Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013). This extension could give a better indication of the possible
policy implications for the central bank. However, I have not pursued this idea further,
but consider it an area for future research.
Despite the limitations, the analysis still provides some evidence of a potential risk-taking
channel of monetary policy in Norway. In addition, the analysis is a good benchmark
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for future research, and may be a small but important step for further investigation
of the existence of a risk-taking channel in Norway. Also, as suggested in the above
section, further exploring the consequences of including diﬀerent risk-weighs, have more
disaggregated data or including additional controls might give additional information
regarding the relationship between monetary policy and banks’ risk-taking.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this thesis has been to present the existing theoretical and empirical litera-
ture regarding the eﬀects of monetary policy on financial stability, as well as to investigate
the potential existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Norway. The first
part of the thesis provides a literature review, including a description of the theoretical
arguments and previous empirical findings related to the five channels of monetary policy
on financial stability. Naturally, as to establish a background for the empirical part of
the thesis, the main focus of the literature review has been on the risk-taking channel.
Related to this channel of monetary policy, there are several theoretical arguments sug-
gesting a negative relationship between monetary policy and banks’ risk-taking, and also,
that the strength of the relationship depends on banks’ capitalization levels.
The theoretical literature presented in section 3.1 suggests that this negative relationship
results from the eﬀects that monetary policy has on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.
Higher monetary policy rates might increase the expected return of banks’ portfolios. As
a consequence, banks may reduce their demand for risky assets or increase the monitoring
of their portfolios. Therefore, higher monetary policy rates might lead to lower banks’
risk-taking. In the opposite direction, argued in the paper by Dell‘Ariccia et al. (2013),
there might be a risk-shifting eﬀect of monetary policy, as higher monetary policy rates
also aﬀect the costs of banks’ liabilities. Higher monetary policy rates that are translated
into higher deposits rates may reduce banks’ margins and the expected profit in case
of success. Therefore, banks operating in a context of limited liability and asymmetric
information may increase their demand for riskier assets or lower the monitoring of their
portfolios in an attempt to restore profits. This partial eﬀect of monetary policy suggests
a positive relationship between central bank interest rates and banks’ risk-taking. Due
to this risk-shifting eﬀect of monetary policy, we might also observe diﬀerences in banks’
risk-taking depending on their capitalization levels: Indeed, banks with higher leverage
will experience a higher direct increase in funding costs, compared to banks with lower
leverage, and the former will therefore be prone to more risk-taking.
The second part of the thesis provides an empirical analysis of a potential risk-taking
channel in Norway. The results from this analysis suggest that banks’ risk-taking is
negatively associated with interest rates. By using quarterly data on individual banks’
aggregate lending to nine diﬀerent industries in Norway, covering all banks and their
corporate lending, the analysis is conducted over the period 1995 to the second quarter of
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2014. The results from the analysis suggest that when the purposed control variables are
included, there is evidence of a negative relationship between the three-month NIBOR
interest rate and banks’ risk-taking in Norway. However, the eﬀect is quite small, and
therefore the economic significance seems modest. Moreover, the model predictions of
a stronger negative relationship for well-capitalized banks are not confirmed. Rather,
my results provide evidence of a weaker negative relationship for well-capitalized banks,
contrary to the implications suggested by the theory as well as previous empirical findings
in other countries.
The Norwegian central bank has already on several occasions emphasized that the pos-
sibility of a low monetary policy rate leading to buildups of financial imbalances could
influence the monetary policy decision (Norges Bank, 2012). Given this, the empirical
evidence presented in this thesis may suggest that the Norwegian central bank should take
these considerations into account, and under some circumstances keep the key policy rate
higher than they otherwise would. However, the estimated eﬀect seems to be of limited
economic significance, since the relevant regression coeﬃcient is relatively small. Further-
more, as was discussed in detail in section 5.3.1, there are several potential drawbacks
of the analysis that may invalidate the policy implications of the results. In addition,
it does not follow immediately that a potential negative eﬀect of policy rates on banks’
risk-taking is unintended. Therefore, both the existence and consequences of a risk-taking
channel in Norway need further investigation, in order to be relevant to the central bank’s
monetary policy decisions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Detailed Description of the Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion
Table 11: Detailed Description of The Classified Industries
Variable Description
Agriculture, forestry and fishing Agriculture, hunting, game preservation,
forestry and services related to forestry,
fishing and hatchery
Extraction of oil and gas Extraction and drilling
related to oil and gas
Manufacturing and mining industry Mining industry and extraction
manufacturing and production of
ships and boats
Water- and electricity supply Water-, gas,- steam- and hot water supply,
and construction activities renovation and sewer systems,
real estate development,
and construction.
Retail, accommodation and Retail, accommodation
food service activities and food service activities
Real estate activities and Sales and management of
other financial activities real estate, professional
and financial services
and business services
Other tertiary industries public services, health, education
and other activities
Shipping and pipeline Shipping and transportation of
pipelines
Transportation and communication transportation, communication
and information
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A.2 Dickey-Fuller Test Results
Table 12: Dickey-Fuller test results
Fisher-type unit-root test for the included dependent and independent variables based on the
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Stata-command: xtunitroot.
H0 = All panels contain unit roots.
Ha = At least one panel is stationary
Variable Description Statistics p-value
3-month NIBOR Inverse chi-squared(326) 705,5691 0,0000
Inverse Normal -15,3365 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -14,3847 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 14,8651 0,0000
Tier -1 capital ratio Inverse chi-squared(304) 664,3404 0,0000
(Tier-1 capital to total Inverse Normal -7,1186 0,0000
risk-weighted assets) Inverse logit t(764) -10,1469 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 14,6137 0,0000
Total capital ratio Inverse chi-squared(304) 752,1238 0,0000
(Regulatory capital to total Inverse Normal -9,7913 0,0000
risk-weighted assets) Inverse logit t(764) -13,3056 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 18,1738 0,0000
Leverage ratio Inverse chi-squared(306) 841,2709 0,0000
(Tier-1 capital to total Inverse Normal -10,2736 0,0000
assets) Inverse logit t(764) -14,6447 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 21,637 0,0000
Growth rate agriculture Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,18E+04 0,0000
Inverse Normal -103,7444 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -253,8628 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 447,4074 0,0000
Growth rate oil and gas Inverse chi-squared(326) 4880,4708 0,0000
Inverse Normal -63,6034 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -105,4422 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 178,3668 0,0000
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Table 13: Dickey-Fuller test results
Growth rate shipping Inverse chi-squared(326) 9208,918 0,0000
Inverse Normal -90,9027 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -198,9527 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 347,8819 0,0000
Growth rate retail Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,18E+04 0,0000
Inverse Normal -103,7444 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -253,8628 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 447,4074 0,0000
Growth rate transportation Inverse chi-squared(326) 9208,9403 0,0000
and communication Inverse Normal -90,9028 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -198,9584 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 347,8828 0,0000
Growth rate other Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,18E+04 0,0000
services Inverse Normal -103,7444 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -253,8628 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 447,4074 0,0000
Growth rate financial Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,12E+04 0,0000
services Inverse Normal -101,2241 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -242,5335 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 426,8711 0,0000
Growth rate manufacturing Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,17E+04 0,0000
Inverse Normal -103,7378 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -253,8325 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 447,3526 0,0000
Growth rate water- and Inverse chi-squared(326) 1,18E+04 0,0000
electricity supply Inverse Normal -103,7444 0,0000
Inverse logit t(819) -253,8628 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 447,4074 0,0000
Risk Time trend is included
Inverse chi-squared(324) 677,128 0,0000
Inverse Normal -8,9282 0,0000
Inverse logit t(809) -10,1741 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 13,8722 0,0000
Bank size Inverse chi-squared(324) 406,547 0,0012
(log of total assets) Inverse Normal 3,7853 0,9999
Inverse logit t(809) 2,4082 0,9919
Modified inv. Chi-squared 3,2428 0,0006
Growth rate bank size Inverse chi-squared(324) 4798,8571 0,0000
Inverse Normal -59,7541 0,0000
Inverse logit t(809) -103,9887 0,0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared 175,789 0,0000
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A.3 Banks’ Losses on Loans as a Percentage of Lending to the
Respective Industries
Chart 2: Pecentage Losses Manufacturing Chart 3: Percentage Losses Agriculture
Chart 4: Percentage Losses Oil and Gas Chart 5: Percentage Losses Tertiary Industries
Chart 6: Percentage Losses Retail Chart 7: Percentage Losses Shipping
Chart 8: Percentage Losses Financial Services Chart 9: Percentage Losses Water Supply
Chart 10: Percentage Losses Transportation
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A.4 Norges Bank’s Indicators of Financial Imbalances
• The ratio of total credit 31 to mainland GDP.
Based on Norwegian data Anh (2011) finds that this indicator historically has shown
a particularly sharp rise ahead of financial crises, and therefore has a good perfor-
mance in terms of its ability to signal a financial crisis.
• The ratio of house prices to household disposable income.
Property prices will have an influence on agents’ borrowing preferences and their
access to credit since real estate is used both as an asset and as collateral. A
sharp decline in house prices might lead to an increase in banks’ loan losses, both
directly, related to higher default rates on loans, and indirectly, due to a fall in total
demand caused by rising unemployment and lower economic activity as real estate
construction slows down.
• Commercial property prices.
In Norway, commercial property have historically exposed banks to the largest loan
losses (Norges Bank, 2013a)
• The wholesale funding ratio of Norwegian credit institutions.
A rise in banks’ share of wholesale funding indicates that the lending growth is
higher than the deposit growth. This ratio is an indicator of the potential build-up
of financial imbalances since banks’ access to wholesale funding often dries up or
funding costs increase substantially in turbulent times.
31The two credit indicators C2 and C3 measure total credit. C2 is an approximate measure of the
magnitude of the gross domestic debt of households, non-financial enterprises and municipalities in NOK
and foreign currency, while C3 gives an indication of the total gross debt, i.e. the sum of the public’s
gross domestic and gross external debt (SSB, 2014).
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A.5 Data Sources
• Aggregated data and description of the OBBOF reporting
Name: ORBOF reporting (In Norwegian only)
Webpage: http://www.ssb.no/innrapportering/naeringsliv/orbof
• Value added in diﬀerent industries in Norway
Name: Value added at basic prices. Current prices (NOK million)
Table: 09171
Webpage: https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?
MainTable=KNRProduksjonInnt&KortNavnWeb=knr&PLanguage=0&checked=true
• 3-month NIBOR interest rate in Norway
Name: Three month NIBOR interest rates
Webpage: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/Historical-monetary-statistics/
Short-term-interest-rates/
• Concession Register in Norway
Name: Concession Register from The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway
Webpage: http://finanstilsynet.no/no/Venstremeny/Konsesjonsregister/
A.6 Correlation Matrix of Bank loan Losses
Table 14: Correlation Matrix
Agriculture Oil Manufac. Water s. Retail Shipping Transpo. Financial Tertiary
Agriculture 1.000
Oil 0.5452 1.000
Manufac. 0.7112 0.5791 1.000
Water s. 0.7609 0.6257 0.6754 1.000
Retail 0.4822 0.4671 0.6160 0.6191 1.000
Shipping - 0.0300 0.1692 0.1133 0.3348 0.3438 1.000
Transpo. 0.2960 0.3987 0.5323 0.5129 0.7565 0.5407 1.000
Financial 0.5668 0.6268 0.7438 0.4371 0.6235 0.2190 0.6010 1.000
Tertiary 0.7862 0.7492 0.7542 0.7426 0.5044 0.0070 0.4500 0.6056 1.000
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